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Public Education, Local Authority, and
Democracy: The Implied Power of North
Carolina Counties to Impose School Impact
Fees
MICHAEL F. ROESSLER*

Communities across North Carolina are struggling to meet the
demands placed on their public schools by booming enrollments. Hundreds
of millions of dollars in school construction money have been spent in recent
years, and hundreds of millions more are projected to be needed in coming
years. Some county governments, which are obligated under state law to
provide revenue for school capital needs, have turned to school impact fees
on new residential development to raise this revenue. North Carolina's
courts, however, have been inhospitable to counties' claims that they have
the implied authority under state law to impose such fees, striking down
school impact fee ordinances in a number of counties, including Durham and
Union. The courts have concluded that counties may not impose school
impact fees without express authorization to do so from the General
Assembly.
This conclusion, however, has been in error. It is true that counties
possess no express power under existing law to impose school impact fees.
But counties' power and duty to regulate and govern in the areas of the
public's health, safety, and welfare, the use and development of land, and the
construction of public schools, when broadly interpreted in accord with the
mandates of state law, serve as the bases for the implied authority to impose
school impact fees under existing law. This is a conclusion that not only
comports with numerous statutory grants of power to local government, but
with the normative role played by democracy in our system of laws and
government.

* Juris Doctor with Honors, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008.
Litigation attorney with the Charlotte office of Lanier Law Group, P.A. The views
expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of his
employer.
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INTRODUCTION

Public schools in North Carolina's fast-growing communities are
facing the dual challenges of overcrowding and underfunding.' The
recent boom in the state's population' has resulted in a corresponding
boom in public school enrollment.3 Counties, in the face of surging

1. See, e.g., Partnership for North Carolina's Future, Reality Check for North
Carolina:PopulationPressures Strain NC Infrastructureand Threaten Future Economy and
available at http://www.ncfuturenow.org/
Quality of Life, at 2 (2007),
elements/pdf/PNCFRealityCheck.pdf (last visited January 4, 2011) (noting that North
Carolina would need to spend $9.8 billion between 2007 and 2012 to replace
deteriorating school facilities and mobile classroom units); N.C. Dep't of Public
Instruction-School Design Clearinghouse, Costs of Recent School Projects, at 6 (April 5,
2010) (noting that between 2004 and 2009, public school construction in North
Carolina cost more than $2.88 billion).
To access the cost report, go to
www.schoolclearinghouse.org, click on the link for "Construction Costs" and then click
on the link for "Costs of Recent NC School Projects."
2. The population of North Carolina was 5,880,095 in 1980 and 6,632,448 in 1990.
N.C. Office of Management and Budget, Population Overview: 1970-1995, available at
http://www.osbm.state.nc.us/ncosbm/facts-and-figures/socioeconomic-data/populationestimates/demog/pop7095.html#a (last visited January 4, 2011). The state's population
in July 2009 was estimated to be 9,382,610, an increase of nearly 60% from 1980 and
more than 41% from 1990. N.C. Office of Management and Budget, 2009 Provisional
at
http://www.osbm.state.nc.us/
Estimates,
available
Population
County
ncosbm/facts.and-figures/socioeconomic.data/population estimates/demog/countygrow
thprov_2009.html (last visited January 4, 2011).
3. In the 1999-2000 school year, total student enrollment in North Carolina's
public schools, grades kindergarten through twelve, was 1,261,770. N.C. Dep't of Public
Profile
Schools
Statistical
Public
Carolina
North
Instruction,
2000, at 5, Table 1, availableat http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/fbs/resources/datal
statisticalprofile/2000profile.pdf (last visited January 4, 2011). Ten years later, by the
2009-2010 school year, total pupil enrollment (excluding charter school students) grew
to 1,426,792, an increase of more than 10%. N.C. Dep't of Public Instruction, Facts and
Figures 2009-10, available at http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/fbs/resources/data/
factsfigures/2009-10figures.pdf (last visited January 4, 2011). Some counties have seen
much larger increases than have other counties. For example, enrollment during the
1998-1999 school year for Mecklenburg and Wake counties, respectively, was 104,313
and 95,779. N.C. Dep't of Public Instruction, North CarolinaPublic Schools Statistical
available at http://www.ncpublicschools.org/
298,
224,
Profile 2000, at
docs/fbs/resources/data/ statisticalprofile/2000profile.pdf (last visited January 4, 2011).
Ten years later, by the first month of the 2008-2009 school year, enrollment in
Mecklenburg and Wake counties increased to 125,239 and 138,141, respectively. N.C.
Dep't of Public Instruction, North Carolina Public Schools Statistical Profile 2009, at 216,
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/fbs/resources/data/
at
available
290,
statisticalprofile/2009profile.pdf (last visited January 4, 2011). So whereas the state's
public school enrollment grew roughly 10% in the first decade of the twenty-first
century, Mecklenburg County's enrollment grew more than 20% and Wake County's
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public school enrollment, have seen the cost of providing school
facilities dramatically increase.' Between 1995 and 2008, government
officials across North Carolina asked voters to approve 104 bond
packages, totaling $10.8 billion, to fund school construction and
renovation; voters approved 84 of those bond proposals, totaling more
than $8.8 billion.
Bond revenue comes at a cost, however. Counties that issue general
obligation bonds are pledging their taxing authority as collateral,
meaning that when counties issue such bonds, they are pledging to use
tax revenue to make bond payments.' This means that counties required
to make budgetary room for bond payments face the choice of either
cutting programs or increasing taxes, particularly property taxes.' This
choice has prompted some counties to seek means other than general
obligation bonds to generate revenue for school construction and
renovation (or to select ways other than property taxation to generate

enrollment boomed by more than 44%. If the state's overall increase in public school
enrollment was manageable during this time period, increases in the fastest-growing
counties of North Carolina were sometimes at a breakneck pace.
4. State law obligates counties to meet public schools' capital needs. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-408(b) (2010). According to the North Carolina Department of Public
Instruction, the cost of building public schools between 2004 and 2010 exceeded $3.2
billion. N.C. Dep't of Public Instruction-School Design Clearinghouse, Costs of Recent
School Projects (July 10, 2010), available at http://www.schoolclearinghouse.org (last
visited January 4, 2011). To access the cost data for recent school construction, click on
the link for "Construction Costs" and then click on the link for "Cost of Recent NC
School Projects."
5. N.C. Dep't of Public Instruction-School Design Clearinghouse, Local Bond
Issues
for
Schools
Since
1995
(March
19,
2010),
available
at
http://www.schoolclearinghouse.org (last visited January 4, 2011). To access the bond
data, click on the link for "Publications and Guides" and then click on the link for "Local
School Bond Issues Since 1995."
6. See David M. Lawrence & A. John Vogt, Capital Planning, Budgeting, and Debt
Financing, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA 17-18 (David M.
Lawrence, ed., 2006), available at http://www.sog.unc.edu/pubs/cmg/cmgl7.pdf (last
visited January 4, 2011) ("The promise of the borrowing government is
straightforward-it will levy whatever amount of tax is necessary to pay principal and
interest-and can be enforced by the legal action of any bondholder.").
7. Property tax revenue is the primary means by which counties in North Carolina
fund their operations. See Shea Riggsbee Denning & Gary A. Wagner, The Property Tax,
COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA 14-15 (David M. Lawrence,
ed., 2006), available at http://www.sog.unc.edu/pubs/cmg/cmgl4.pdf (last visited
January 4, 2011) (noting that the property tax remains the primary general revenue
source for local governments in North Carolina).
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revenue to pay the debt service on bonds).' Among these other means
have been so-called school impact fees charged to developers of
residential developments on a per-housing unit basis and designed to
offset the cost of providing the schools that will be necessary to
accommodate the students expected to move into these new homes.'
But counties' ability to employ this alternative tool of revenue generation
has been dealt a blow by two decisions of the North Carolina Court of
Appeals: Durham Land Owners Association v. County of Durham,"o striking
down such an ordinance in Durham County, and Union Land Owners
Association v. County of Union," striking down a similar ordinance in
Union County.
This Article examines the authority of counties in North Carolina to
impose fees such as those attempted in Durham and Union Counties and
concludes, contrary to the decisions of the court of appeals, that
counties do have the implied authority under existing law to impose
such fees for the purpose of generating school construction revenue.'
8. See Michael Biesecker, Way cleared for lawsuit, THE (RALEIGH) NEWS AND
OBSERVER, May 14, 2004, at B3 (explaining that revenue from Durham County's impact
fee was to be used "to pay a sizeable portion of the debt service on the $105 million in
school construction bonds that voters approved in November").
9. As explained infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text, the Durham and Union
ordinances differed in some respects. The essence of both ordinances, however, was the
same: the imposition of a per-housing-unit fee on new residential development designed
to generate funds to build and renovate schools. The counties' ordinances also raised the
same legal questions, notwithstanding the differences between them.
10. Durham Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Durham, 630 S.E.2d 200 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2006).
11. Union Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Union, 689 S.E.2d 504 (N.C. Ct. App.
2009).
12. This Article does not address two other opinions recently issued by the court of
appeals that also invalidated ordinances similar to those adopted in Durham and Union
Counties. In Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary, 698 S.E.2d 404 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010),
the court invalidated an ordinance adopted by the city of Cary that sought to impose fees
on new development to generate school construction revenue. This case raises issues
slightly different than the issues raised by Durham and Union Counties' ordinances
because counties are required under state law to contribute funds for school
construction, but municipalities are not. Amward therefore raises a question related to,
but different from, the question raised by Durham and Union Counties' ordinances and
addressed in this Article, that of whether counties may impose such fees under existing
law. In Lanvale Props, LLC v. County of Cabarrus, No. COAO9-1610, 2010 N.C. App.
Lexis 1659 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2010) (unpublished opinion), the court invalidated
Cabarrus County's effort to assess fees for new school construction. In that decision, the
court essentially concluded that the court's previous decisions invalidating the Durham
and Union ordinances required the court to invalidate Cabarrus County's. Lanvale Props,
2010 N.C. App. Lexis 1659, at *9-10. This Article's argument therefore also applies to
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This conclusion is reached not by a mechanistic application of rules of
law, but with an application of the law that keeps in mind the aim of the
North Carolina Constitution, the state's form of government, and the
laws that distribute power to local governments. Simply put, this Article
argues that an examination of the questions raised in Durham Land
Owners and Union Land Owners necessarily requires a normative
examination and choice, not a merely technical one, regarding how our
laws shall be interpreted and what they shall be determined to mean, a
task that the court of appeals failed to undertake when it struck down
Durham and Union Counties' school impact fees. The normative
principle this Article employs as its guide is, in a word, democracy." To
that end, this Article asks how Durham and Union Counties' school
impact fees fare when examined in the context of seeking to achieve
popular self-government and democratic accountability. This Article
concludes these aims are generally best served when local officials who
govern as a result of popular consent are given significant latitude to
tackle local issues. This Article, in short, argues that the school impact
fees adopted by Durham and Union Counties were authorized under
existing law and that this conclusion is strengthened when the scope of

the ordinance at issue in Lanvale; this recent case is not discussed in the body of this
Article, however, because the court offered no new reasoning for the ordinance's
invalidation, but instead simply relied on the precedents from Durham and Union
Counties. Lanvale did raise an issue not present in the Durham or Union cases, that of
an express statutory authorization from the General Assembly allowing Cabarrus County
to apply its ordinance to all of the county's unincorporated areas. Id. at *9-11. The
court, for reasons not relevant to this Article, interpreted that individualized
authorization as insufficient to allow the county to adopt a school impact fee or its
equivalent. Id. If this unique statutory component in Lanvale is relevant to the argument
presented by this Article, it is because the legislature's passage of a statute authorizing
Cabarrus County to impose its ordinance to all unincorporated areas of the county
implies the legislature believed the county had the authority to adopt such an ordinance
in the first place. The Lanvale court rejected this argument. See id. at *9-10 ("[T]he
County contendis] that it would be 'absurd' to read House Bill 224 as enabling the
County to 'enforce' its [Adequate Public Facilities Ordinance] if the ordinance were not
'otherwise authorized.' As we have already concluded, however, Union Land Owners
Ass'n foreclosed the argument that an [Adequate Public Facilities Ordinance], such as the
one at issue here, is 'otherwise authorized' under the counties' general zoning and
subdivision powers.").
13. "Democracy" is not self-defining, of course. For purposes of this Article, the
word stands for the proposition that, as a general rule and in the absence of
extraordinary circumstances, the people and their legislative representatives should be
permitted to make policy choices that in their judgment seem necessary or appropriate
and that the people and their legislative representatives should then be electorally and
popularly responsible for the choices they make.
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local government authority is examined under the criterion of achieving
democracy.
This argument proceeds in several steps. First, the details of the
Durham and Union school impact fee ordinances, as well as the North
Carolina Court of Appeals' analysis of the ordinances, are examined.
Next, the principles of law-both statutory and constitutionalgoverning the scope of counties' power in North Carolina are reviewed.
Then, those principles of law are applied to the Durham and Union
ordinances to demonstrate that the counties were authorized to impose
the school impact fees, contrary to the conclusions of the court of
appeals, and that allowing counties to levy such fees serves the values of
popular self-government and democratic accountability.
There is no dispute that counties across North Carolina will need to
generate hundreds of millions of dollars in coming years to pay for the
Commissioners in
construction and renovation of public schools."
Durham and Union Counties, using their knowledge of local
circumstances and exercising their judgment as to the best means of
meeting their communities' needs, decided to impose school impact fees
as at least a partial solution to the challenge of meeting school
construction costs. The shortcomings of the decisions by the court of
appeals invalidating the commissioners' decisions are to be found not
only in the practical consequence of eliminating one possible revenue
source for the construction of new schools, but in the court's failure to
appreciate that the laws of North Carolina aim to achieve democracy
and, ultimately, that the work of interpreting the state's laws can only be
properly performed with regard to and respect for this normative aim.
I.

THE ORDINANCES AND THE COURT DECISIONS

A review of the decisions in Durham Land Owners and Union Land
Owners must address two sets of relevant legal questions. The first,
which this Article refers to as "the framework questions," informs the
interpretive framework to be used when examining questions of local
government authority. In other words, this set of questions deals with
rules of interpretation that are relevant to all judicial review, including
review of actions taken by local governments, and substantive rules of
law that are relevant to any analysis of a local government's exercise of
power, regardless of the subject of the particular exercise of power under
review. The second set of questions, which this Article refers to as "the
substantive questions," concerns the examination of various substantive
14. See, e.g., supra notes 4-5.
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grants of power to local governments to regulate in different areas of
human activity-for example, education and land development-and an
analysis of whether these grants of power are sufficient to allow local
government to regulate in a particular manner, in this case to impose
school impact fees. Together, the exploration of these two sets of
questions allows for a complete analysis of those powers possessed by
local governments-particularly, in the case of the school impact fees
invalidated by the court of appeals, counties-and those activities that
may be subjected to local governments' regulatory authority under
existing law.
A.

Durham County
1. Background

In 2003, Durham County adopted an ordinance imposing school
impact fees on new residential construction." The fee was to be $2,000
for single-family residences and $1,155 for multi-family residences, and
the fees were to be assessed as part of the county's building-permit
process.'" No certificates of occupancy for new residential units would
be issued until the fees assessed against the units were collected." The
fees were expected to raise $4.8 million a year to be used for school
construction and renovation.' 8
Durham County enacted the ordinance "[a]fter many years of
rejected petitions to the General Assembly requesting enabling
legislation to impose a school impact fee. . . ."" The county, upon

15. See Michael Biesecker, Board approves impact fees, THE (RALEIGH) NEWS AND
Sept. 9, 2003, at BI [hereinafter Biesecker, Board approves impact fees].
16. Durham Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Durham, 630 S.E.2d 200, 202 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2006).
17. Id.
18. See Biesecker, Board approves impactfees, supra note 15.
19. Durham Land Owners, 630 S.E.2d at 202. The court, by mentioning the county's
previous unsuccessful attempts to secure express legislative permission to levy an impact
fee, suggested that this somehow means the county knew all along that it did not have
the authority under existing law to adopt such a fee. This may very well be true, but it
also may not, for the county may have been motivated in its earlier requests to the
General Assembly to avoid any question whatsoever about the county's power to impose
the fee and thereby avoid litigation like that which followed the county's adoption of the
fee. Even if the county at one time believed it did not have authority under existing law
to impose a school impact fee, the county's understanding was not controlling on the
question before the court. It is the duty of the courts, not counties, to determine the law.
OBSERVER,
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enacting the ordinance, identified several sources of authority for doing
so, including the power of counties to fix fees for providing county
services, the police power, the power to regulate development and land
use, the education provisions of the North Carolina Constitution, and
the common law powers of the county." The question before the court
was whether any of these provisions provided the county with sufficient
authority to impose the school impact fee. 2 '
2.

The Framework Questions

The Durham Land Owners court began its analysis of the framework
questions by citing an undisputed axiom: "Counties are creatures of the
General Assembly and have no inherent legislative powers.

. .

. They are

instrumentalities of state government and possess only those powers the
General Assembly has conferred upon them."22 This is the fundamental
first rule in analyzing the nature and scope of any North Carolina local
government's power .2' The rule's restatement by the court thus properly
began the necessary work of framing the issue under consideration.
The court then spent considerable time addressing section 153A-4
of the North Carolina General Statutes, or what this Article calls "the
broad construction statute," which states:
It is the policy of the General Assembly that the counties of this State
should have adequate authority to exercise the powers, rights, duties,

functions, privileges, and immunities conferred upon them by law. To
this end, the provisions of this Chapter and of local acts shall be broadly
construed and grants of power shall be construed to include any powers
that are reasonably expedient to the exercise of the power.2 4

See Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5 (1787) (stating that the courts are duty-bound to
perform the work of judicial review).
20. Durham Land Owners, 630 S.E.2d at 202.
21. Id.
22. Id. (quoting Craig v. County of Chatham, 565 S.E.2d 172, 175 (N.C. 2002)).
23. See Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 186 S.E.2d 897, 902 (N.C. 1972) (internal
citations omitted) (stating that a municipal government possesses only those powers
given to it by the legislature).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-4 (2010). The law's reference to "this Chapter" is a
reference to the chapter of the general statutes that establishes the power of counties,
meaning the broad construction statute applies to any and all statutory grants of power
to the counties.
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This provision, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1971,25
represented legislators' decision to turn their backs on a nineteenthcentury rule strictly and narrowly construing any grants of power to
local governments, the so-called "Dillon's Rule."2 6 The legislature's
intention to abandon Dillon's Rule by enacting this statute can be found
in the new law's title: "Broad Construction."2 7
The Durham Land Owners court said that the broad construction
statute was previously interpreted by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina in Homebuilders Association of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte" as
applying to grants of power to local governments "only if there is an
ambiguity" in such statutes.2 9 This was so, the court of appeals said,
because "if the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous when
applying ordinary meaning and grammar to its text, the legislative intent
Only when statutory language is
behind it is readily apparent."3
ambiguous must the court resort to 'judicial construction . . . grounded
in the statute's perceived intent or purpose,"3 ' turning then to broad
construction as an interpretive aid. If a reviewing court deems a grant of
power to counties to be unambiguous, the General Assembly's express
statement that counties' powers be broadly construed becomes a dead
letter and a provision of law in which counties seeking to justify an
exercise of power may not seek refuge, according to the Durham Land
Owners court.
The court, therefore, framed the issue before it by citation to two
rules of interpretation and law-local governments have limited powers
and only ambiguous grants of authority are to be broadly construedthat suggested any exercise of local government power in the absence of
express legislative authorization was improper. As to the framework
questions, the court struck a posture hostile to Durham County's
imposition of a school impact fee.

25. See Homebuilders Ass'n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45, 49
(1994) (discussing adoption of the broad construction statute in 1971 as part of "a
comprehensive rewrite of the municipal statutes").
26. Id. at 50 (concluding the broad construction statute replaced Dillon's Rule).
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-4.
28. See Homebuilders Ass'n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45 (N.C.
1994).
29. Durham Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Durham, 630 S.E.2d 200, 203 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2006).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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The Substantive Questions

The Durham Land Owners court reviewed several areas of
substantive law that the county argued supported its ability to impose a
school impact fee.
The court first turned to section 153A-102 of the North Carolina
General Statutes, which gives counties the power to "fix the fees and
commissions charged by county officers and employees for performing
services or duties permitted or required by law."n
The court
concluded-correctly, in the view of this Article-that this provision
did not give the county the authority to levy the school impact fee."
The court noted that "[t]he language of section 153A-102 intimates a
'fee' in this context is more in line with a fixed cost to a recipient for an
over-the-counter type service provided by a county officer or employee
who is performing that service, processing, or transaction pursuant to
law."3 ' The court, to support this conclusion, pointed to the statute's
placement in the part of chapter 153A that governs county
administration.
The court also limited the scope of the statute's
meaning by referring to the law's second sentence: "The board may not,
however, fix fees in the General Court of Justice or modify the fees of the
register of deeds . . . or the fees of the board of elections . . . ."36 These
limitations on the power of counties to set fees, the court explained,
supported the conclusion that the general grant of authority to set fees
"is not a broad based, revenue generating provision designed to offset the
cost of any service the County provides, but only those services that its
officers or employees provide pursuant to their position within county
government."37 The court therefore concluded that "giving meaningful
effect to the textual limitations on the power to charge fees yields a
determination that the services covered are more routine, documentoriented tasks, that require the assistance of a person within county

32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-102.
33. Durham Land Owners, 630 S.E.2d at 205 (concluding that section 153A-102 of
the North Carolina General Statutes does not authorize imposition of a school impact
fee).
34. Id. at 204.
35. Id.
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-102; see Durham Land Owners, 630 S.E.2d at 204
(interpreting the first sentence of the statute in light of the second sentence of the
statute).
37. DurhamLand Owners, 630 S.E.2d at 204.
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government."" The fee statute could not serve as the authority for
school impact fees.
The court then turned to the county's claim that its police powers
provided a basis for imposing school impact fees. Section 153A-121
grants seemingly sweeping police powers to counties: "A county may by
ordinance define, regulate, prohibit, or abate acts, omissions, or
conditions detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens and
the peace and dignity of the county; and may define and abate
nuisances."3 9 The court, however, failed to undertake any meaningful
analysis of whether this grant of power was sufficient authorization for
the county to impose school impact fees. Instead, the court noted the
existence of the county's police power and then promptly turned to an
analysis of the county's zoning and land development powers.4 0 The
court thus left an open question-despite its assertion to the
contrary'-as to whether the county's police power could serve as the
authority to levy a school impact fee.
The court did engage in a more thorough analysis of the county's
claim that its zoning powers authorized school impact fees. Section
153A-340 authorizes counties to "adopt zoning and development
regulation ordinances" so as to "promot[e] health, safety, morals, or the
general welfare."42 And, as the court noted, zoning ordinances are to be
38. Id.
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-121(a). The remaining two subdivisions of section
153A-121 prohibit counties from regulating certain matters under the management of
the Board of Transportation or a public utility and provide that the ordinance does not
limit the ability of local boards of health to adopt rules and regulations designed to
protect and promote public health. See N.C. GEN. STAT. Hi 153A-121(b)-(c). These
subdivisions of the statute do not relate to the power of counties to levy school impact
fees, but they are relevant because they demonstrate that when the General Assembly
desires to prohibit counties from engaging in certain kinds of lawmaking, it certainly
knows how to do so. That legislators have not expressly prohibited counties from
imposing school impact fees is therefore germane to the discussion of whether counties
may do so.
40. See Durham Land Owners, 630 S.E.2d at 205-06 (noting that Durham County
cited its police powers as a basis for imposing a school impact fee, and then failing to
analyze the scope and nature of the county's police power and the merits of Durham
County's position).
41. See id. at 206 (concluding, after an analysis of the county's zoning powers, that
"we can find no authority to support a determination that pursuant to the County's
zoning and general police powers that it has the necessary statutory authority to impose
a school impact fee").
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-340. The language of this statute closely mirrors the
classic definition of the police power. See, e.g., Thomas v. Sanderlin, 91 S.E. 1028, 1029
(N.C. 1917) (describing the police power as a means of safeguarding "the general safety,
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drafted and adopted "to facilitate the adequate provision of
transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public
requirements."4
The Durham Land Owners court began its analysis of these
provisions by discussing the meaning of Homebuilders Association of
Charlotte v. City of Charlotte." In Homebuilders, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina found that Charlotte could impose fees for providing
certain services, such as reviewing permits and processing applications,
without express statutory authorization to do so.4 5 The city could
impose the fees without express statutory authorization, the
Homebuilders court held, because of the broad construction statute
applicable to cities.4 6 Just as Charlotte was found to have the power to
levy certain fees without express authorization, Durham County argued
that it had the authority to impose school impact fees without express
authorization."
The court rejected this argument by concluding that "[wihile
perhaps not stating it explicitly, we do not believe the supreme court
intended to allow a city or county's zoning power to authorize it to
charge a fee for providing its actual government services to the public.""
Rather, the court of appeals reasoned, the fees at issue in Homebuilders
the public welfare, and the peace, good order, and morals of the community"). This
grant of power, in other words, is one that expressly allows the county to pursue the
traditional ends of the police power through the means of zoning and land development
regulations. This perhaps explains the court's decision to analyze the county's police
power only in terms of the county's zoning power. See supra notes 40-41 and
accompanying text. If so, this was in error, for to do so would be to mistake the general
grant of the police power with the grant of a particular, narrower form of the police
power and, additionally, would make the general grant of the police power found in
section 153A-121 of the North Carolina General Statutes superfluous by making it
duplicative of the zoning power found in section 153A-340. The court should avoid
interpreting the law in a way that renders any of its provisions superfluous. See, e.g.,
Morris Commc'ns Corp. v. Bessemer City Zoning Board of Adjustment, 689 S.E.2d 880,
885 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) ("Such statutory construction is not permitted, because a
statute must be construed, if possible, to give meaning and effect to all of its provisions."
(quoting HCA Crossroads Residential Cntrs. v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 398 S.E.2d
466, 470 (N.C. 1990))).
43. Durham Land Owners, 630 S.E.2d at 205 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-341).
44. Homebuilders Ass'n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45 (N.C. 1994).
45. Durham Land Owners, 630 S.E.2d at 205 (citing Homebuilders, 442 S.E.2d at 50).
46. Id. Section 160A-4 is the broad construction statute for municipalities and is
analogous to the broad construction statute applicable to counties and found in section
153A-4 of the North Carolina General Statutes.
47. Durham Land Owners, 630 S.E.2d at 200.
48. Id. at 205.
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were for over-the-counter services such a permit review, floodplain
analysis, and final plat review."9 Importantly, and as the Durham Land
Owners court recognized,5 0 the supreme court had not announced such a
rule in Homebuilders; the Durham Land Owners court chose to infer it.
The court's choice to limit the meaning of the broad construction
statute beyond that required by the supreme court in Homebuilders
ultimately proved to be unnecessary to the court's treatment of Durham
County's claim that the county's zoning powers authorized adoption of
the school impact fee, for the court chose not to analyze on its merits the
county's claim that its zoning power, whether construed broadly or
narrowly, authorized adoption of the school impact fee. 5 ' The court
noted this portion of the county's argument, and then promptly ignored
it.

Durham County also cited constitutional and common law
authority to justify its power to impose school impact fees,5 but the
court largely ignored those arguments, even as it purported to analyze
and dispose of them. In full, the court's review of the county's
constitutional and common law arguments ran three sentences:
The County argues that when 'there is a constitutional mandate to
provide an adequate education combined with the constitutional
guarantee to use revenues to fund these constitutional mandates, the
common law provides the authority to raise funds to meet the
constitutional requirements imposed on counties.' We cannot agree.
Considering that counties cannot act, in particular generate revenue
from the public, without some form of statutory authority, the County's
common law argument is plagued with shortcomings.53
This conclusion is not supported by a single citation to authority, nor
are any of the shortcomings perceived by the court enumerated or
explained.
The Durham Land Owners court, in sum, rejected four potential
bases for the county's authority to impose school impact fees: the fee

49. Id.
50. Id. (noting that the Homebuilders court had not explicitly stated such a rule).
51. Id. at 205-06 (noting the county's reliance on the zoning power as authorization
to adopt the school impact fee ordinance, and then failing to discuss the substance of the
county's argument).
52. Id. at 202 (explaining that Durham County cited constitutional and common law
authority to impose its school impact fee).
53. Id. at 206.
54. Id.
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statute (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-102)," the police power (N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 153A-121), 56 the zoning power (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-340),-" and the
education mandate of the North Carolina Constitution."
Durham
County's school impact fee was therefore invalidated," and the Supreme
Court of North Carolina rejected the county's petition for discretionary
review.so
B.

Union County
1. Background

Commissioners in Union County were not deterred by the court of
appeals' decision in Durham Land Owners. In October 2006, just four
months after the court struck down Durham County's school impact fee,
Union County adopted its so-called Adequate Public Facilities
Ordinance."1 As with Durham County, commissioners in Union County
adopted the ordinance to help regulate development in terms of
providing for adequate public schools," and also like their colleagues in
Durham County, the Union County commissioners adopted the
ordinance after the General Assembly rejected the county's previous,
multiple requests for express authority to impose school impact fees.63
Union County's regulation, unlike the Durham County ordinance,
did not simply assess a flat per-housing-unit fee on all new residential

55. See id. at 203-05 (discussing and rejecting section 153A-102 of the North
Carolina General Statutes as authority to impose school impact fees).
56. See id. at 205-06 (discussing and rejecting section 153A-121 of the North
Carolina General Statutes as authority to impose school impact fees).
57. See id. (discussing and rejecting section 153A-340 of the North Carolina General
Statutes as authority to impose school impact fees).
58. See id. at 206 (discussing and rejecting the education mandates of the North
Carolina Constitution as authority to impose school impact fees).
59. See id. at 208 (noting that the trial court was correct to conclude the county had
no authority to impose its school impact fee).
60. See Durham Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Durham, 633 S.E.2d 678, 679
(N.C. 2006) (denying Durham County's petition for discretionary review by the Supreme
Court of North Carolina).
61. Union Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Union, 689 S.E.2d 504, 505 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2009).
62. See id. at 504 (noting that the ordinance "provides county planners and
developers with a methodology for evaluating the impact of proposed residential
developments on schools within unincorporated areas of Union County").
63. See id. (noting that legislators rejected Union County's requests for express
authorization to impose school impact fees in 1998, 2000, and 2005).
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development. Instead, Union County established a procedure for
calculating a so-called "Voluntary Mitigation Payment."" Each proposed
residential development was to be reviewed to determine if it would
"overburden the capacity of schools serving the development.",6 If not,
would be "approved without additional
then development
66
If the development was projected to overburden the
consideration."
schools, then the proposal would either be rejected by the county or, in
Although the
the alternative, approved with certain conditions."
ordinance authorized a range of possible conditions-deferred approval
of the development or incremental approval of the development to
essence
match the growing capacity of the schools, for example 68-the
of the ordinance was the condition that developments projected to
overburden the schools would be approved upon payment by the
developer of the Voluntary Mitigation Payment.69 in other words, the
ordinance represented an effort to impose a school impact fee without
labeling it as such. 0
64. Id. (describing that, as a condition of permit approval, the ordinance would
require a Voluntary Mitigation Payment from residential developers whose proposed
projects were projected to overburden the public schools).
65. Id. at 505.
66. Id.
67. See id. (explaining that proposed developments that were projected to
overburden the schools would be rejected or conditionally approved).
68. See id. (listing a range of conditions authorized by the ordinance, including
deferred approval, incremental approval, and payment of the so-called Voluntary
Mitigation Payment).
69. The centrality of the Voluntary Mitigation Payment to the ordinance and the
litigation it prompted is evidenced by the fact that those parties that sued to challenge
the ordinance sought return of all payments made pursuant to the ordinance and that the
court focused its analysis on the Voluntary Mitigation Payment. See id. at 506-08.
70. On this point, the Court of Appeals was surely correct to note that Union
County "may not use the [Adequate Public Facilities Ordinance] to obtain indirectly the
payment of what amounts to a school impact feel,] given that [Union County] lacks the
authority to impose school impact fees directly." Id. at 508. The court's observation that
Union County lacked authority to impose a school impact fee is a direct result and
application of Durham Land Owners. See id. (reading Durham Land Owners as prohibiting
the imposition of a school impact fee without express legislative authorization). Union
County's efforts to work around the rule announced in Durham Land Owners is
understandable, but it is also understandable that the Union Land Owners court, given the
precedent of Durham Land Owners, would not allow labels to affect the court's analysis.
The way out of this quandary is not to play word games, but to recognize that Durham
Land Owners was wrongly decided and that both the Durham and Union ordinances
should have been upheld as proper exercises of the counties' authority. After the
decision by the Durham Land Owner's court, this could only be accomplished by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina. See In re Appeal of the Civil Penalty Assessed for
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The Framework Questions

The Union Land Owners court was correct, when framing the issues
raised by the parties, to note the fundamental rule governing the nature
and scope of local governments' powers in North Carolina:
'[Clounties ... have no inherent legislative powers.
They are
instrumentalities of state government and possess only those powers the
General Assembly has conferred upon them."'n This is the necessary
starting point when beginning the work of establishing the interpretive
framework within which the court was to examine the question before
it. Citation to an axiom, however, is not analysis, and reference to a
baseline rule of law is not a test of that rule's boundaries.
The Union Land Owners court said little else to help frame the issues
it was examining. The court noted that "this case turns on what actions
the General Assembly has authorized [Union County] to take in
regulating zoning and managing subdivision development,"n which
amounts to little more than a restatement of the axiom that counties may
only exercise those powers given to them by the legislature, and that
Union County was asking the court "to construe broadly the county's
police power . . its zoning powers . .. and its subdivision regulation

power,"7 although the court did not reference, discuss, or apply the
statute requiring counties' powers to be broadly construed."
3.

The Substantive Questions

Union County cited two of the same bases for its authority to
impose school impact fees as Durham County cited to justify its actions.
Authorization to impose the fees could be found, the county argued, in
the county's police power and the power to regulate zoning and the

Violations of the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (N.C. 1989)
("Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different
case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been
overturned by a higher court.").
71. Union Land Owners, 689 S.E.2d at 508 (quoting Five C's, Inc. v. County of
Pasquotank, 672 S.E.2d 737, 740 (N.C. 2009)).
72. Id. at 506.
73. Id.
74. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-4 (2010) (mandating that counties' powers are to be
broadly construed).
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subdivision of land.15 The court rejected each of these as authority to
impose school impact fees.
The court quickly disposed of the argument that the county's police
power authorized adoption of the ordinance:
[TIhe General Assembly has enacted the zoning and subdivision
regulation statutes for the purpose of delineating the authority of county
governments to regulate the development of real estate. For that reason,
we believe that [Union County] correctly has tied the [Adequate Public
Facilities Ordinance] to its zoning and subdivision regulation authority
and that [the police power statute, section 153A-121 of the North
Carolina General Statutes,] does not provide an independent source of
authority for the [Adequate Public Facilities Ordinance] .76
To conclude otherwise, the court reasoned, "would eviscerate existing
limitations on [Union County's] zoning and subdivision regulation
authority."7 Thus, the court concluded that the very existence of the
county's zoning and subdivision powers meant the county could not rely
on its police power as authority to adopt its school impact fees.
The court accordingly turned its attention to the county's zoning
power. After noting that "'[sitatutory interpretation properly begins
with an examination of the plain words of the statute,""' the court
looked to the language of section 153A-340(a) of the North Carolina
General Statues:
"For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general
welfare, a county may adopt zoning and development regulation
ordinances. ... A zoning ordinance may regulate and restrict the height,
number of stories and size of buildings and other structures, the
percentage of lots that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and
other open spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of
buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other
purposes."7
The court interpreted this provision as setting forth "specific elements
[the county] is allowed to regulate and restrict" pursuant to its zoning
power."0
75. See Union Land Owners, 689 S.E.2d at 506 (identifying the police power, zoning

power, and subdivision power as those cited by the county as authority to impose school
impact fees).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 507 (quoting Three Guys Real Estate v. Harnett County, 480 S.E.2d 681,
683 (N.C. 1997)).
79. Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-340(a)).
80. Id. at 507.
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The court then looked to section 153A-341 of the North Carolina
General Statutes, which states that zoning regulations,
may address, among other things, the following public purposes: to
prevent overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of
population; to lessen congestion in the streets; . . . and to facilitate the
efficient and adequate provision of . .. schools . .. and other public

requirements. The regulations shall be made with a view to ...
encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the county.
. . . In addition, the regulations shall be made with reasonable

consideration to expansion and development of any cities within the
county, so as to provide for their orderly growth and development.
Construing sections 153A-340(a) and 153A-341 in para materia,8 2
the court concluded that the subjects of the county's zoning power, as
outlined in section 153A-341, could only be regulated in the manner
identified in section 153A-340(a). 8 3 "In other words," the court said,
"although [Union County] is entitled to use its zoning authority to
facilitate the efficient and adequate provision of schools, it must achieve
this goal using the tools authorized by the zoning statute."8
The
county's school impact fee ordinance "does not utilize any of the zoning
powers enumerated in section 153A-340. Therefore, the ordinance falls
outside of the [county's] legislatively granted zoning powers. "85
The court, after rejecting the county's zoning power as authority for
school impact fees, turned to the county's subdivision powers. The
county argued that section 153A-331(a), which allows counties to
"provide for the orderly growth and development of the county ... in a
manner that will avoid congestion and overcrowding and will create
conditions that substantially promote public health, safety, and the
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-341; see Union Land Owners, 689 S.E.2d at 507
(identifying section 153A-341 as listing those "legislative objects" that may be subjected
to the county's zoning power).
82. This canon of interpretation requires statutes addressing the same subject to be
interpreted in light of one another. See, e.g., Lutz v. Gaston Bd. of Educ., 192 S.E.2d
463, 471 (N.C. 1972) ("Statutes dealing with the same subject matter must be construed
in para materia,and harmonized, if possible, to give effect to each." (internal punctuation
and citations omitted)); Redevelopment Comm'n of Greensboro v. Sec. Nat'l Bank of
Greensboro, 114 S.E.2d 688, 698 (N.C. 1960) ("It is a fundamental rule of statutory
construction that sections and acts in pari materia, and all parts thereof, should be
construed together and compared with each other." (internal citations omitted)).
83. Union Land Owners, 689 S.E.2d at 507.
84. Id.
85. Id. For an analysis of the flaws in the court's interpretation of the relationship
between sections 153A-340(a) and 153A-341, see infra notes 360-63 and accompanying
text.
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general welfare,"" provided sufficient authority to adopt school impact
fees." The county cited as another basis for authority to impose school
impact fees the power "by ordinance [to] regulate the subdivision of land
within its territorial jurisdiction."8 Faced with ambiguous statutes that
spoke to the very issues the county's ordinance was designed to
address-"orderly growth and development," avoiding "congestion and
overcrowding," creating conditions "that substantially promote public
health, safety, and the general welfare," and the regulation of the
subdivision of land for residential development-the court could have
turned to the rule of broad construction required by section 153A-104
and found the county's ordinance was "reasonably expedient to the
exercise of [its expressly granted] powers.""
But this the court did not do. After noting the county's citation to
these statutes as authorization to impose school impact fees, the court
avoided meaningful analysis of these statutes and merely repeated an
axiom that no party to the litigation disputed: "Nevertheless,
'[ciounties ... have no inherent legislative powers.
They are
instrumentalities of state government and possess only those powers the
General Assembly has conferred upon them."" The court reiterated
what all parties to the litigation conceded, that "nowhere within [the
statutes granting subdivision powers to counties] does the General
Assembly authorize [counties] to adopt a land use regulation ordinance
pursuant to which a developer may be forced to make a payment of
money, donate land, or provide school construction."" Again, this was
not disputed by the parties and was, in fact, the very reason for the
litigation. With this, the court disposed of the county's arguments
relying on subdivision powers to justify the adoption of school impact
fees.
The court concluded its analysis with the observation that the
decision in Durham Land Owners stood for the proposition that counties
are not permitted to adopt regulations or ordinances "to shift
impermissibly a portion of the burden for funding school construction
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-331(a).
87. See Union Land Owners, 689 S.E.2d at 508 (noting the county's citation of section
153A-331(a) as one basis for the authority to impose school impact fees).
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-330; see Union Land Owners, 689 S.E.2d at 507-08
(noting the county's citation of section 153A-330 as one basis for the authority to impose
school impact fees).
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-104.
90. Union Land Owners, 689 S.E.2d at 508 (quoting Five C's, Inc. v. County of
Pasquotank, 672 S.E.2d 737, 740 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)).
91. Id.
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onto developers seeking approval for new developments."9 2 Then, in the
only portion of the Union Land Owners opinion to touch on the
constitutional issues relevant to the case, the court said Union County's
ordinance exceeded the county's statutory authority "because our
Constitution places the duty to fund public schools on the General
Assembly and local governments and because the General Assembly has
neither expressly nor impliedly authorized [the county] to shift that
duty using subdivision ordinances that impose fees or use similar
devices upon developers of new construction . .

. .

The impact fee was

struck down," and the Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected the
county's petition for discretionary review of the decision."
II.

TAKING ANOTHER LOOK AT THE FRAMEWORK AND SUBSTANTIVE
PRINCIPLES

An alternative analysis of the Durham and Union County
ordinances can only be undertaken after first engaging in a thorough
review of those principles and rules of law that must inform such an
analysis. The Durham Land Owners and Union Land Owners courts either
treated these principles and rules incompletely or simply ignored them
altogether. This Article will identify and explain these principles and
rules, which will then allow for their application to the question of
whether Durham and Union Counties exceeded their authority by
imposing school impact fees.
A. The Framework Principles
A discussion of how to decide the nature and scope of local
governments' authority in North Carolina must not simply recite, as
though to state a rule is to decide its application, those axioms that
inform such questions. Rather, such a discussion must evaluate and
apply those axioms, six of which are particularly helpful to the task of
answering the so-called interpretive questions.
The first, and certainly most important, axiom among this group is
that local governments are only permitted to exercise those powers that

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Union Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Union, 703 S.E.2d 148, 148 (N.C. 2010)
(denying Union County's petition for discretionary review by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina).
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are given to them by the legislature.96 There are three components to
this rule's discussion. The first examines the historic role of Dillon's Rule
in North Carolina." The rule, which requires that grants of power by
state authorities to local governments be narrowly construed, 98 has
ceased to be the law in North Carolina.99 The second step examines the
formal rejection of Dillon's Rule and its replacement with a rule that
requires grants of power to local governments to be broadly construed.o
The third step takes stock of the powerful legacy of Dillon's Rule and the
ways in which the rule continues to influence judicial decisions, despite
the legislature's rejection of the rule.' 0
After reviewing Dillon's Rule and its rejection and legacy, this
Article reviews five other axioms that inform the interpretive questions.
First, legislative action by democratic majorities is presumptively
constitutional.102 Second, the wisdom of legislation is not reviewable by
the courts. 03 Third, local governments, because of their proximity to
and knowledge of problems facing their communities, often will know
best how to solve those problems and will develop a sort of local
Fourth, the state's system of laws must not be placed in a
expertise.'
straitjacket of the past's making, but rather must be permitted to
innovate and experiment to meet the challenges of the present and the
And fifth, while the legislature may restrict the power and
future.'
authority of local governments as to all matters placed in the hands of
the General Assembly, legislators may not modify direct grants of power
to local governments made by the people via the North Carolina
Constitution. 106

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Supra notes 22-23, 71 and accompanying text.
Infra Part II.A.1.a.
Infra Part I.A.1.a.
Infra Part II.A.1.b.
Infra Part II.A.1.b.
Infra Part II.A.1.c.
Infra Part II.A.2.a.
Infra Part II.A.2.b.
Infra Part II.A.2.c.
Infra Part II.A.2.d.
Infra Part II.A.2.e.
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It is undisputed that local governments in North Carolina, whether
cities or counties and only subject to a few exceptions, 0 7 have only those
powers and that authority the General Assembly grants them.os The
state's courts applied this axiom, until the late twentieth century, in
tandem with Dillon's Rule.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina first cited Dillon's Rule in
1874 in the case of Smith v. City of New Bern,09 and Dillon's Rule would
remain the law in North Carolina for the century thereafter.n 0 The court
observed in Smith "that a municipal corporation possesses and can
exercise the following powers and no others: First, those granted in
express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to
the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the declared
objects and purposes of the corporation.""' The court cited Judge John
Dillon's treatise on municipal corporations in support of this rule," 2
which cast the power of local governments as both limited and narrow.
This is not to say that North Carolina's courts always imposed a
cramped interpretation of local governments' powers during the reign of
Dillon's Rule. Indeed, in Smith itself, the court rejected the claim that
New Bern exceeded its authority when the city built a market house on
the basis of its power to maintain a market place."' The lesson to draw

107. Infra Part II.A.2.e (explaining that direct delegations of power to local
governments by the people, via the constitution, are beyond the control of the General
Assembly).
108. See, e.g., Craig v. County of Chatham, 565 S.E.2d 172, 175 (N.C. 2002)
("Counties are creatures of the General Assembly and have no inherent legislative
powers. . . . They are instrumentalities of state government and possess only those
powers the General Assembly has conferred upon them." (internal citations omitted)).
109. Smith v. City of New Bern, 70 N.C. 14 (1874); see Homebuilders Ass'n of
Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45, 49 (N.C. 1994) (citing Smith as the earliest
North Carolina case to invoke Dillon's Rule).
110. See Homebuilders, 442 S.E.2d at 49-50 (discussing the General Assembly's
rejection of Dillon's Rule by the 1971 passage of the broad construction statute).
111. Smith, 70 N.C. at 18.
112. See id.
113. See id. (concluding that municipal authority to "appoint[] a market place and
regulatlel the same" fairly implied the power of the city to build a market house). One
scholar has noted that North Carolina's courts broadly construed municipal authority
prior to 1890, despite citation to Dillon's Rule. See David W. Owens, Local Government
Authority to Implement Smart Growth Programs: Dillon's Rule, Legislative Reform, and the
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from this holding is that even when Dillon's Rule was the law in North
Carolina, the rule was no talisman. Rather, it was a tool of interpretation
to be applied on a case-by-case basis with an eye towards the ends the
law sought to achieve, as the Smith court explained:
It may be that at the time of this [legislative] grant [of power to New
Bern to appoint and maintain a market place], in the rude beginning of
society in this country, the immediate erection of a market house was not
within the means of the corporation or intended by the grant any more
than the costly structures which now adorn American cities under
similar grants; but as population, wealth and refinement advance, public
decency, comfort and convenience require the exercise of those reserved
powers of the [city's] charter 'to make all such necessary ordinances,
rules and orders as may tend to the advantage, improvement and good
government of the town." 14
In other words, to merely recite Dillon's Rule or any other axiom or
baseline rule was not-and still is not-to present an argument against
any particular exercise of power, but rather to frame the issue under
Dillon's Rule required grants of power to local
consideration.
governments to be construed narrowly, but how narrowly and in
relation to what standard? Answering such questions is the real work of
interpreting the law.

b. Rejecting Dillon's Rule
Dillon's Rule is no more in North Carolina. The General Assembly
has decreed that the powers granted to local governments are to be
broadly construed.1 1 5 This mandate requires interpretation, of course.
The language of the broad construction statute is the starting point for
the law's analysis: 1 .
Current State of Affairs in North Carolina, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 671, 682 (2000)
[hereinafter Owens, Dillon's Rule] ("Prior to 1890, the North Carolina Supreme Court
broadly construed city authority.").
114. Id. at 20. The language of the city charter referenced by the court is similar to
the language of today's police power statute. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-121(a) (2010)
("A county may by ordinance define, regulate, prohibit, or abate acts, omissions, or
conditions detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens and the peace and
dignity of the county; and may define and abate nuisances."). This suggests that the
police power should be viewed as a font of authority for counties to take all reasonable
steps to meet the challenges of contemporary governance.
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-4 (mandating that grants of power to counties are to be
broadly construed); see also id. § 160A-177 (mandating that grants of power to cities and
towns are to be broadly construed).
116. Union Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Union, 689 S.E.2d 504, 507 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2009) ("'Statutory interpretation properly begins with an examination of the plain
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It is the policy of the General Assembly that the counties of this State
should have adequate authority to exercise the powers, rights, duties,
functions, privileges, and immunities conferred upon them by law. To
this end, the provisions of this Chapter and of local acts shall be broadly
construed and grants of power shall be construed to include any powers
that are reasonably expedient to the exercise of the power."
The key language in the statute is that which mandates express grants of
power to local governments are to be construed to "include powers that
are reasonably expedient to the exercises of the [express] power.""' A
look at dictionaries and case law sheds light on the meaning of
"reasonably expedient."
One dictionary defines "expedient" as "suitable for achieving a
particular end in a given circumstance."" 9 Another defines the word as
"tending to promote some proposed or desired object; fit or suitable for
the purpose; proper under the circumstances," 20 while a third defines
"expedient" as "helpful or useful in a particular situation, and without
considering any moral question that might influence your decision.""'
The thrust of the word's meaning is that something is expedient if it is a
suitable way of achieving a particular purpose.
The word "reasonably," which modifies "expedient" in the broad
construction statute, has a clear meaning in the law. It means simply that
which has some rational relationship to some legitimate end,'22 and the
courts use the standard of reasonableness as one that grants significant
leeway to decision makers who craft public policy. 123

words of the statute."' (quoting Three Guys Real Estate v. Harnett County, 480 S.E.2d
681, 683 (N.C. 1997))).
117. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-4.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Merriam-Webster
Online,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
expedient (last visited January 4, 2011).
120. Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browselexpedient (last visited
January 4, 2011).
121. Cambridge Dictionary of American English, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/
define.asp?key-expedient*1+0&amp;dict-A (last visited January 4, 2011).
122. See, e.g., Bradley-Reid Corp. v. N.C. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 689 S.E.2d
494, 503 (N.C. 2009) (describing, in the context of the police power and substantive due
process, the reasonableness standard as requiring "a rational relation to a valid state
objective" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The adverb "reasonably" used in section
153A-4 of the North Carolina General Statutes thus means counties have those powers
that a legislator could believe had a rational relation to an end the county may seek to
achieve.
123. Goodman Toyota, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 306 S.E.2d 192, 194-95 (N.C. Ct. App.
1983) ("[Any exercise by a municipality of its police power is presumed valid, and when
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It seems accurate, then, to conclude that an implied power is
reasonably expedient if a local government could rationally conclude
that the implied power was a suitable means of achieving a purpose that
the local government is authorized to pursue or a duty that the local
government is obligated to perform. In the context of counties paying
for the construction of school facilities, if the county adopting a school
impact fee could rationally conclude that imposing and collecting an
impact fee was a suitable manner of generating revenue for such
projects, which counties are expressly required to pay for, then the
power to adopt a school impact fee would be reasonably expedient.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina first interpreted the
municipal broad construction statute in Homebuilders Association of
Charlotte v. City of Charlotte,"' declaring that the General Assembly
rejected Dillon's Rule when, in 1971, legislators comprehensively
rewrote the laws governing municipal power.'25 Dillon's Rule suggested
a narrow construction of municipal power, 126 but the municipal broad
construction statute "makes it clear that the provisions of chapter 160A
[of the North Carolina General Statutes, governing the authority of
municipalities,] and of city charters shall be broadly construed . . . to

include any additional and supplementary powers that are reasonably
necessary or expedient to carry them into execution and effect."'27 The
conflict between Dillon's Rule and the broad construction statute was to
be resolved in favor of the broad construction statute, which the court
said was "the proper rule of construction."
The Homebuilders court did not disturb the well-established
understanding regarding the source of local governments' powers; the
court reiterated that local governments "'ha[vel only such powers as the
legislature confers upon [them] ."'129 The rule to be extracted from the
the reasonableness of an ordinance is debatable, judicial discretion gives way to
legislative judgment. Consequently, the party challenging the regulation has the burden
of showing its unreasonableness."). It follows from this that if it is debatable whether a
county's power is reasonably expedient, the matter should be resolved in favor of the
county's determination of the question.
124. Homebuilders Ass'n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45 (N.C. 1994).
The cities' and counties' broad construction statutes, while not identical, are similar and
have been interpreted by the courts as having the same meaning. The two statutes are, in
essence, parallel laws that create the same rule for cities and counties.
125. Id. at 49.
126. Id. at 50.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 49 (quoting Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 186 S.E.2d 897, 902 (N.C.
1972)).
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Homebuilders decision is that the powers of local government are limited,
but broad. A court charged with determining whether particular action
by a local government exceeds the grant of authority given to the local
government must therefore examine two distinct questions, one of
limitation and one of breadth.
Another look at Smith v City of New Berno may help illustrate this
distinction. Remember that in Smith, New Bern had been granted the
power by the General Assembly to appoint and regulate a market
place.'3 ' The city, under the auspices of this authority, decided to build
a market house at the appointed market place.13 ' The decision to
construct the market house was challenged as exceeding the city's
authority to appoint and regulate a market place. 3 3
As to the question of the city's limited powers, the Smith court
noted that the city was authorized to appoint and regulate a market
place.3 3 The city, in other words, had been given some amount of power
to establish and regulate a market place; this power was among the
limited powers of the city. As to the question of the breadth of the city's
power to establish and regulate a market place, the court noted that the
scope of the city's power to do so was to be determined by reference to
Dillon's Rule.' 3 ' That is, the grant of some power to the city to establish
and regulate a market place-once the court determined some such
power had, in fact, been given to the city-was to be narrowly construed
and limited to those powers granted in express words, those powers

130. Smith v. City of New Bern, 70 N.C. 14 (1874). It is true that Smith was decided
using Dillon's Rule, not the broad construction statute. This is irrelevant, however, to
using Smith as an object lesson in differentiating between questions of limitation and
questions of breadth. Both were in play in Smith, just as they are under the rule
extracted from the Homebuilders decision and the broad construction statute. On the
question of limitation, Smith and modern-day cases decided under the broad
construction statute agree that local governments in North Carolina have only those
powers granted to them by the legislature, with a small number of exceptions. See infra
Parts II.A.1, II.A.2.e. On the question of breadth, Smith was decided under Dillon's Rule,
which required the powers of local government to be narrowly interpreted, while
modem-day cases decided under the broad construction statute are to interpret the
powers of local government broadly. The same questions of limitation and breadth that
courts must confront today thus were also present in Smith; what has changed is the
standard by which the questions are to be assessed.
131. Smith, 70 N.C. at 18.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 17.
134. Id. at 18.
135. Id.
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fairly or necessarily implied from such express grants, or, those powers
essential to achieving the objects or aims of the city.'3 6
Questions of whether a local government exceeds its authority are
therefore two-step inquiries. The first step asks whether the legislature
has given the local government some power to regulate and govern in the
field of human activity in question. If the legislature has granted no
such power, then the local government has exceeded its authority and
the inquiry is at an end; the local governmental action in question is
void. If the local government possesses, however, some authority to
regulate or govern in the field of human activity in question, then a
second inquiry is required, one that asks if the grant of power, broadly
interpreted and applying the standard of reasonable expediency, can
support the local government's action.'
If not, then the local
then
the local government's
government's action is void. But if so,
action must be deemed as within the scope of the local government's
authority. Put differently, a reviewing court must first ask, "Can this
local government regulate or govern this kind of activity?" If the court
answers in the affirmative, then the court must ask, "Can this local
government regulate or govern this kind of activity in this way?"
The court implicitly performed this two-step inquiry in Smith, and
it repeated the inquiry 120 years later in Homebuilders. The question
presented in Homebuilders was whether Charlotte could charge a user fee
for providing a range of development-related services, such as permit
The court first noted that the city had express
and zoning review.'
authority to regulate zoning, subdivision of land, streets and alleys,
erosion and sedimentation control, and the removal, replacement, and
preservation of trees.'39 The court thus began its analysis by answering
in the affirmative the first question in the two-step inquiry-"Can the
city regulate this field of activity?"-before moving to the second
question of whether the city could regulate this field of activity in the

136. Id.
137. The statutory command that powers granted to local governments are to be
broadly construed can apply only to the second question in the two-step inquiry. Only
after determining that a local government has some power to regulate or govern in a field
of human activity can the court then turn to the task of broadly construing those powers
granted, for if a local government has not been granted any authority to govern an area of
human activity, then there is no way to broadly construe the local government's lack of
authority. Nothing, broadly construed, is still nothing.
138. Homebuilders Ass'n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45, 47-48
(N.C. 1994).
139. See id. at 48-49. The parties to the litigation in Homebuilders stipulated that the
city had authority to regulate these areas of activity. See id. at 48.
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way the city chose, namely, by imposing fees for certain services. The
court also answered this second question in the affirmative, citing the
city's power to regulate various development-related activities" and the
city's police power to support this conclusion.14 ' The scope of these
specific grants of power, the court explained, was to be assessed in light
of the broad construction statute. 142
c.

Narrowly Reading the Command of Broad Construction

Despite the Homebuilders court's engaging in this two-step analysis
and declaring it the law of the land, North Carolina's appellate courts
have sometimes undercut the command of broad construction. The
courts have done so by conflating the two characteristics that define the
nature and scope of local government powers in North Carolina:
limitation and breadth.
The court of appeals, for example, recently explained in BellSouth
Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Laurinburg43 how it viewed the
legislature's command of broad construction, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina:
The narrow Dillon's Rule of statutory construction used when
interpreting municipal powers has been replaced by N.C. Gen Stat.
§ 160A-4's mandate that the language of Chapter 160A be construed in
favor of extending powers to a municipality where there is an ambiguity
in the authorizing language, or the powers clearly authorized reasonably
necessitate additional and supplementary powers to carry them into
execution and effect[.] However, where the plain meaning of the statute
is without ambiguity, it must be enforced as written.144
The command of the Homebuilders court that municipal powers be
interpreted in light of the broad construction statute was thusly
transformed by the court of appeals from the rule into an exception to
the rule; the broad construction statute is not to be a tool of
interpretation regularly used by the courts, but a tool used only in
circumstances when a grant of power from the legislature to local
governments is deemed ambiguous. This cramped interpretation of the
broad construction statute, in addition to seemingly disregarding
Homebuilders, ignores the mandatory language of the statute that grants
140.
141.
142.
143.
2005).
144.

Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 49.
Id.
BellSouth Telecomm's. Inc. v. City of Laurinburg, 606 S.E.2d 721 (N.C. Ct. App.
Id. at 726 (internal citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted).
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of power to municipalities "shall be broadly construed and grants of
power shall be construed to include any additional and supplementary
powers that are reasonably necessary or expedient to carry [the express
powers and duties] into execution and effect.""'
The court of appeals reached its conclusion in BellSouth regarding
the operation of the broad construction statute after reviewing three
decisions issued by the supreme court: Homebuilders Association of
Charlottev. City of Charlotte,'4 6 Bowers v. City of High Point,"' and Smith
Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham."'* The court of appeals
concluded, in short, that the Homebuilders court called on the broad
construction statute because there was ambiguity in the substantive
statutes under review, but that the Bowers and Smith Chapel courts did
not invoke the broad construction statute because the substantive
statutes under review in those cases were unambiguous and, therefore,
not subject to the broad construction statute.' 4 9
This attempted
reconciliation of Homebuilders, Bowers, and Smith Chapel suffers from
shortcomings, however.
The Homebuilders court decided that the command of broad
construction contained in section 160A-4 of the North Carolina General
Statutes replaced the common law rule known as Dillon's Rule.so It
followed from this, the court concluded, that Charlotte had sufficient
implied authority to adopt a schedule of fees for providing a variety of
municipal services that the city was expressly authorized or obligated to
perform."' Homebuilders, therefore, seemed to represent the supreme
court's decision to take at face value, as required,"' the legislature's
command to broadly construe the powers granted to local governments.
Then came Bowers. There, the supreme court determined that a
city had no power to define the base rate of pay to be used to calculate

145. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-4 (2010) (emphasis added).

146. Homebuilders Ass'n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45 (N.C. 1994).
147. Bowers v. City of High Point, 451 S.E.2d 284 (N.C. 1994).
148. Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 517 S.E.2d 874 (N.C. 1999).
149. See BellSouth Telecomm's, 606 S.E.2d at 725-26 (reconciling Homebuilders,
Bowers, and Smith Chapel in this manner).
150. See Homebuilders, 442 S.E.2d at 50; see also supra note 123 and accompanying
text.
151. Homebuilders, 442 S.E.2d at 50.
152. See Durham Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Durham, 630 S.E.2d 200, 203
(N.C. Ct. App. 2006) ("[llf the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous when
applying ordinary meaning and grammar to its text, the legislative intent behind it is
readily apparent.").
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Importantly, the
separation allowances for retiring police officers.'15
that
set
the manner by
court pointed to specific statutory language
which retiring officers' pay in such situations was to be calculated.'
Because state law set the manner for calculating retiring officers'
separation allowances, and because the city was not given express
authority to deviate from this method, the court held the city exceeded
its power by attempting to do so.'
Bowers, therefore, seems to stand
not for the proposition that a lack of ambiguity in statutory grants of
power renders the broad construction statute inapplicable, as the court
of appeals said in BellSouth,"' but that when state law expressly provides
a particular, exclusive manner by which a city is required to perform a
task assigned to it, the city is not entitled to ignore such a statutory
command.
This also seems to be the better way of understanding Smith
Chapel."'
Durham had adopted a comprehensive storm water
maintenance program," which the city claimed was done pursuant to
authority granted to it by the General Assembly.'5 9 The supreme court,
however, decided the storm water fees assessed by the city were used for
purposes in excess of those allowed by the statutory grant of authority.'60
State law allowed the assessment of fees to maintain storm water run-off
infrastructure, the court said,161 but the city also used the revenue for
unauthorized purposes, such as for a public awareness and education
campaign.'6 2 The court therefore ruled against the city, again for much
the same reason as in Bowers: the General Assembly had identified
specific programs that a storm water run-off fee could fund, and the city
used the money for uses other than those authorized. In the face of a

153. Bowers v. City of High Point, 451 S.E.2d 284, 291 (N.C. 1994).
154. Id. at 288.
155. Id. at 291.
156. BellSouth Telecomm's. Inc. v. City of Laurinburg, 606 S.E.2d 721, 726 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2005) (interpreting Bowers as standing for the proposition that a lack of statutory
ambiguity renders the broad construction statute inapplicable).
157. Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 517 S.E.2d 874 (N.C. 1999).
158. Id. at 877.
159. Id. at 877-79 (noting the city's reliance on sections 160A-311 and 160A-314 of
the North Carolina General Statutes as authority to adopt its storm water maintenance
program).
160. Id. at 878.
161. Id. at 879 (concluding that state law allowed collection of storm water run-off
fees by cities only "for the establishment and maintenance of physical systems directly
related to storm water removal and drainage of property").
162. Id. at 879-81.
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legislative command to do one thing, Durham had done another, thereby
exceeding the power granted to it.
Contrary to the BellSouth court's view of Homebuilders, Bowers, and
Smith Chapel, a better reconciliation of the three decisions is that when a
statute expressly provides a means for local government to perform a
task and that means is fairly interpreted as exclusive, local government
may not do otherwise. This interpretation allows the General Assembly
to provide for flexibility in local government while also preserving the
legislature's authority over local governments in North Carolina: local
governments will operate under the default rule of pragmatic flexibility
established by the broad construction statute, but the legislature at any
time may step in and prescribe a particular means of performing a task,
thereby trumping the default rule of broad construction and limiting the
discretion of local policy makers. Of the three cases reviewed by the
BellSouth court, Homebuilders operated under the default rule, while
Bowers and Smith Chapel were cases where the General Assembly
affirmatively disregarded the default rule. This reconciliation of the
cases explains their outcomes and preserves a robust role for the broad
construction statute, which the statute itself seems to require.'63
This approach also avoids the shortcoming of conflating questions
of limitation and breadth.'" The BellSouth court posited that if a grant
of power to local government is unambiguous, then the broad
construction statute need not be employed.'6 5 But concluding that a
grant of power is unambiguous does not answer the question of how
broadly the grant of power is to be construed; it only recognizes that the
local government has some power to regulate or govern in a particular
field of activity. An additional step, that of broadly construing the
unambiguous grant of power, must next be taken to determine the
boundaries of the local government's power.
It may also be the case that Bowers and Smith Chapel, instead of
being nuanced decisions that require a sophisticated effort to reconcile
them with Homebuilders and the broad construction statute, are simply
wrong. They may be nothing more than judicial lab rats, among the
supreme court's first, halting efforts to interpret the broad construction

163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-4 (2010) (stating that county powers "shall" be broadly
construed); see also id. § 160A-4 (stating that municipal powers "shall" be broadly
construed).
164. See supra notes 129-42 and accompanying text.
165. BellSouth Tellecomm's Inc. v. City of Laurinburg, 606 S.E.2d 721, 726 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2005).
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statute, which had undergone little prior judicial interpretation 6 6 and, at
the same time, among the first times the court was called upon to
disregard the century-old Dillon's Rule with which the courts were more
familiar.16 7 Bowers and Smith Chapel may be no more than errors in the
process of trial and error.
2.

Democratic Rules of Interpretationand Construction

Other rules of interpretation and construction, each playing a part
in answering the framework questions posed by the school impact fee
cases, must also be considered when attempting to determine whether a
local government has exceeded its authority.
a. Acts of Policy Makers are Presumed to be Constitutional
North Carolina courts have long recognized that "any reasonable
doubt [about the constitutionality of legislation] will be resolved in favor
of the lawful exercise of their powers by the representatives of the
people."' 68 Put differently, "[iun considering the constitutionality of a
166. Homebuilders Ass'n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45, 50 (N.C.
1994) (noting that the case was the first to squarely present the question of how the
broad construction statute interacted with Dillon's Rule).
167. Evidence of lingering reliance on Dillon's Rule can be found, for example, in
Porsch Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 276 S.E.2d 443 (N.C. 1981). Despite the
broad construction statute being on the books for a decade when Porsch was decided, the
court seemed to rely on Dillon's Rule and ignore the broad construction statute: "[lit is
generally held that statutory delegations of power to municipalities should be strictly
construed, resolving any ambiguity against the corporation's authority to exercise the
power. This Court has long held that any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the
existence of the power is resolved against the corporation." Id. at 445 (internal citations
omitted). Although the Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded in Homebuilders
that the broad construction rule replaced Dillon's Rule, a unanimous court in Bowers
cited a formulation of Dillon's Rule and then attempted to describe the broad
construction statute as a reiteration of Dillon's Rule, at least to some degree. Bowers v.
City of High Point, 451 S.E.2d 284, 287-88 (N.C. 1994) (attempting to reconcile
Dillon's Rule and the broad construction statute). At least one scholar has noted the
Supreme Court of North Carolina's struggle to follow the legislative command to replace
Dillon's Rule with the broad construction statute. Owens, Dillon's Rule, supra note 113,
at 679-80 (noting that between 1971 and 2000, "courts have struggled to reconcile a
century of precedent with a revised legislative intent").
168. Sutton v. Phillips, 21 S.E. 968, 968 (N.C. 1895); see also Martin v. N.C. Hous.
Corp., 175 S.E.2d 665, 671 (N.C. 1970) (citing State v. Leuders, 200 S.E. 22, 24 (N.C.
1938) ("When the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, 'every presumption is
indulged in favor of its validity."'); State v. Harris, 6 S.E.2d 854, 867 (N.C. 1940) ("We
are aware of our duty to sustain an act of the Legislature where its constitutionality may
be merely a matter of doubt.").
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statute, it is well established that the courts will indulge every
presumption in favor of its constitutionality."169
A dedication to
democratic self-government serves as part of the justification for this
rule, for "[in our representative democracy the Legislature peculiarly
represents the popular will."o Policy makers within local government
also enjoy the same presumption: "A municipal ordinance is presumed
to be valid, and the burden is upon the complaining party to show its
invalidity or inapplicability . . . ."1"

b.

The Wisdom of a Policy Is Not Reviewable by the Courts

A related principle is that the wisdom of policy decisions is not the
proper subject of judicial review. "So long as their action is not
arbitrary, capricious, or is in disregard of the law, the Court is not
concerned with the wisdom of the course [elected officials] intend to
This standard is sometimes
pursue,"" the court has explained.
described as preventing judicial invalidation of duly enacted laws absent
an abuse of discretion by lawmakers. 7 3 This is a long-standing principle
in North Carolina,"7 and one that is applied to local policymakers just as
it is applied to state lawmakers. 7 5
169. Painter v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 217 S.E.2d 650, 659 (N.C. 1975).
170. State v. Harris, 6 S.E.2d 854, 867 (1940) (Devin, J., concurring). The rule that
acts of policy makers are to be presumed constitutional is also justified in part by
separation-of-powers principles. Adams v. N.C. Dep't of Natural and Econ. Res., 249
S.E.2d 402, 406 (N.C. 1978) ("Implicit in this presumption of constitutionality accorded
to legislative acts is the principle that this Court and the General Assembly 'are
coordinate branches of the state government. Neither is superior to the other."' (quoting
Nicholson v. Educ. Assistance Auth., 168 S.E.2d 401, 406 (N.C. 1969))).
171. Currituck County. v. Wiley, 266 S.E.2d 52, 53 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Smith v. Keator, 206 S.E.2d 203, 206 (N.C. Ct. App.
1974) ("At the threshold of our consideration of the questions here presented[,] we note
the well-recognized rule that where a statute or ordinance is susceptible to two
interpretations-one constitutional and one unconstitutional-the Court should adopt
the interpretation resulting in a finding of constitutionality.").
172. Waldrop v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Pitt County, 53 S.E.2d 263, 265 (N.C.
1949).
173. Painter v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 217 S.E.2d 650, 657 (N.C. 1975) (noting
that local school boards are vested with the power to determine whether new school
buildings are needed and that the boards' decisions will not be invalidated "absent a
manifest abuse of discretion").
174. See, e.g., Hayes v. Benton, 137 S.E. 169 (N.C. 1927) ('In numerous and repeated
decisions the principle has been announced and sustained that courts may not interfere
with discretionary powers conferred on these local administrative boards for the public
welfare unless their action is clearly unreasonable as to amount to an oppressive and
manifest abuse of discretion."' (quoting Newton v. Sch. Comm., 73 S.E. 886, 887 (N.C.
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Local Governments Are Local Experts

Courts also recognize that local policymakers are often best
positioned to assess the problems facing their communities and,
therefore, in the best position to craft effective solutions to those
problems. "It is a well established principle of law that a legislative body
may refer to local authorities questions pertaining to their particular
localities for action thereupon, on the theory that local authorities are
better advised as to local questions,""' the supreme court has noted.
d.

The Law Allows for Innovation and Progress

Society is not stagnant, and neither should the law be. The Supreme
Court of North Carolina observed in the mid-twentieth century, "[t]here
is a definite obligation of law to progress which should not be ignored in
the interpretation of the Constitution.""'

The court said as much in its

first decision referencing Dillon's Rule:
It may be at the time of this grant [of power in the city's 1779 charter
allowing the city to maintain a market place], in the rude beginning of
society in this country, the immediate erection of a market house was
not within the means of the corporation or intended by the grant any
more than the costly structures which now adorn American cities under

1912))); Jones v. Town of N. Wilkesboro, 64 S.E. 866, 869 (N.C. 1909) (Hoke, J.,
dissenting) ("'[It is a principle fully established, here and elsewhere, that courts will
never undertake to direct and control these municipal authorities as to how they shall act
or what plan or method they should adopt on matters which the law has wisely referred
to their judgment and discretion."). "[Only in rare and extreme cases are the courts
allowed to interfere in any way, and should never undertake to direct and control local
authorities as to how they should act on matters which rest in their judgment and
discretion." Id.
175. See, e.g., Painter, 217 S.E.2d at 657 (citing the rule in a review of action by a local
school board); Hayes v. Bd. of Educ. of Gates County, 137 S.E. 169, 170 (N.C. 1927).
176. Efird v. Bd. of Comm'rs for the County of Forsyth, 12 S.E.2d 889, 893 (N.C.
1941). This rule represents an exception to the non-delegation doctrine, which
ordinarily prohibits the legislature from delegating policy-making authority to subsidiary
agencies or entities. See, e.g., Jackson v. Guilford County Bd. of Adjustment, 166 S.E.2d
78, 83 (N.C. 1969) ("The authority of the General Assembly to delegate to municipal
corporations power to legislate concerning local problems, such as zoning, is an
exception . . . to the general rule that the legislative powers vested in Art. II, § 1, of the
Constitution of North Carolina, may not be delegated by it."); In re Annexation
Ordinance No. 866, 117 S.E.2d 795, 803-04 (N.C. 1961) ("The decisions of this Court
support the view that ordinary restrictions with respect to the delegation of power to an
agency of the State, which exercises no function of government, do not apply to cities,
towns, or counties.").
177. State v. Harris, 6 S.E.2d 854, 865 (N.C. 1940).
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similar grants; but as population, wealth and refinement advance, public
decency, comfort and convenience require the exercise of those reserved
powers of the charter to make all such necessary ordinances, rules and
orders as may tend to the advantage, improvement and good government
of the town.178
The court returned to this theme in a recent decision: "[TIhe
Constitution should be given an interpretation 'based upon broad and
liberal principles designed to ascertain the purpose and scope of its
provisions."""
This same spirit is also present in the broad construction statute
itself and its mandate that local government authority is to be construed
in such a way that "the counties of this State should have adequate
authority to exercise the powers, rights, duties, functions, privileges, and
immunities conferred upon them by law."18 o The legislature's decision to
thusly empower local governments suggests lawmakers understood that
exigencies will arise that local governments must address, even if such
exigencies and their remedies were not expressly provided for in state
law. Built into this recognition is an acknowledgement that the law
must be flexible.
e.

Legislators May Not Modify Direct Grants of Power to Local
Government

It is fundamental that local governments in North Carolina possess
only those powers granted to them.st Such grants of power to counties
or municipalities usually come from the legislature, and the legislature is
entitled to modify these grants of power to local governments.'82 A few
grants of power to local governments, however, come directly from the
people by way of the state constitution, and these grants of power are
different than those made by the General Assembly.
In Guthrie v. Taylor, 83 the supreme court differentiated between
authority granted to the State Board of Education by the state

178. Smith v. City of New Bern, 70 N.C. 14, 20 (1874) (internal citations omitted).
179. Coley v. North Carolina, 631 S.E.2d 121, 125 (N.C. 2006) (quoting Elliott v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 166 S.E. 918, 920-21 (1932)).
180. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-4 (2010).
181. Supra notes 22-23, 71 and accompanying text.
182. In re Annexation Ordinance 866, 117 S.E.2d 795, 802 (N.C. 1961) ("The General
Assembly of North Carolina is vested with complete control over municipalities, except
in certain specified matters which are not related to this litigation." (internal citations
omitted)).
183. Guthrie v. Taylor, 185 S.E.2d 193 (N.C. 1971).
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constitution and authority granted to the board by the legislature.18 1 In a
discussion of the non-delegation doctrine,"' the court noted, "[t]his
principle [that the legislature may alter grants of power it makes to
subsidiary units of government] has no application to a direct delegation
by the people, themselves, in the Constitution of the State, of any
portion of their power, legislative or otherwise. In such case, we look
only to the Constitution to determine what power has been delegated."' 6
Furthermore, when the constitution delegates authority to a governing
body, "the delegation is absolute, except as insofar as it is limited by the
Constitution of the State, by the Constitution of the United States or by
the Legislature, or some other agency, pursuant to power expressly
conferred upon it by the Constitution.""' To say such delegations are
"absolute" is to say the legislature may not tinker with them.
This was not the first time the court recognized the distinction
between legislative and constitutional grants of authority. In Coastal
Highway v. Turnpike Authority, again in the context of a dispute that
raised issues of non-delegation, the court said,
It is settled principle of fundamental law, inherent in our constitutional
separation of government into three departments and the assignment of
the lawmaking function exclusively to the legislative department, that
(except when authorized by the Constitution, as is the case with
reference to certain lawmaking powers conferred upon municipal
corporations usually related to matters of self-government), . . . the
Legislature may not abdicate its power to make laws or delegate its
supreme legislative power to any other department or body. 88
The court's remarks in Guthrie and Coastal Highway occurred in the
context of the non-delegation doctrine, a matter not in dispute in the
cases involving the validity of Durham and Union Counties' school
impact fees, but there is no reason the principles governing direct,
constitutional delegations of authority should not apply in the context of
county authority to levy school impact fees. If some part of the counties'
authority to impose school impact fees is to be found in the constitution,
184. Id. at 200 (making the distinction between constitutional grants of authority and
legislative grants of authority).
185. The non-delegation doctrine does not bar the General Assembly from assigning
counties some portion of the duty to meet the requirement of providing public schools,
because the doctrine is not applicable to delegations of power from the legislature to
local governments. Supra note 173 (explaining that the non-delegation doctrine does
not prevent the legislature from assigning governmental duties to local governments).
186. Guthrie, 185 S.E.2d at 200.
187. Id.
188. Coastal Highway v. Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E.2d 310, 316 (N.C. 1953).
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then the legislature's actions or inactions are irrelevant to the
determination of whether counties have the authority to impose such
fees.
B.

The Substantive Principles

The framework principles inform how, using tools of interpretation
and baseline rules of law applicable to all questions of local government
authority, we ought to examine whether a municipality or county has
exceeded the authority granted to it. There are also certain substantive
principles relevant to the particular question of whether counties have
the authority under existing laws to assess school impact fees. These
principles are drawn from three areas of substantive law: police powers,
zoning and subdivision powers, and education powers.
1.

The Police Power

The Supreme Court of North Carolina has explained, "The police
power rests in the individual states, and in the exercise thereof the
legislature may enact laws, within constitutional limits, to protect or
promote the health, morals, order, safety, and general welfare of
society.""
The police power is broad and "as extensive as may be
required for the protection of the public health, safety, morals, and
general welfare." 9 0 Additionally, "[tihe police power may be delegated
by the State to its municipalities whenever deemed necessary by the
Legislature."l 91
This the General Assembly has done: "A county may by ordinance
define, regulate, prohibit, or abate acts, omissions, or conditions
detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens and the peace
and dignity of the county; and may define and abate nuisances."192 This
broad grant of power is made even broader by the General Assembly's
mandate that "[tihe enumeration in this Article or other portions of this
Chapter of specific powers to define, regulate, prohibit or abate acts,
omissions, or conditions is not exclusive, nor is it a limit on the general
authority [of counties] to adopt ordinances [pursuant to the police

189.
190.
191.
192.

City of Raleigh v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 168 S.E.2d 389, 393-94 (N. C. 1969).
A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 258 S.E.2d 444, 448 (N.C. 1979).
Id.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-121(a) (2010).
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power]."
The sweep of the counties' police powers, in other words, is
not to be construed as limited by specific grants of specific powers.
The precise scope of the police power cannot be defined a priori:
"Whether [an exercise of the police power] is a violation of the Law of
the Land Clause or a valid exercise of the police power is a question of
degree and reasonableness in relation to the public good likely to result
from it."'9 4 The inability to precisely define the police power in the
abstract means the power "'may be extended or restricted to meet
changing conditions, economic as well as social.""" The police power is
elastic, and it is the basic, far-reaching instrument with which local
governments, in their sound discretion and judgment, regulate and order
their communities.
The considerable reach of the counties' police power can be
discerned not only from affirmative, statutory grants of power by
lawmakers, but also from the legislature's express restriction of the
counties' police power. Counties, for example, are expressly prohibited
from exercising the police power to "regulate or control vehicular or
pedestrian traffic on a street or highway under the control of the Board
of Transportation"; 6 "regulate or control any right-of-way or right-ofpassage belonging to a public utility, electric or telephone membership
corporation, or public agency of the State";' 97 "regulate or control a
highway right-of-way in a manner inconsistent with State law or an

193. Id. § 153A-124. The grant of police power to the counties is made even broader
in light of the mandate of the broad construction statute. See id. § 153A-4 (mandating
grants of power to counties be broadly construed).
194. In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 193 S.E.2d 729, 735 (N.C.
1973).
195. A-S-P Assocs., 258 S.E.2d at 449 (quoting City of Winston-Salem v. S. R.R. Co.,
105 S.E.2d 37, 41 (N.C. 1958)); see also cf. Wells v. Hous. Auth. of the City of
Wilmington, 197 S.E. 693, 696 (N.C. 1938) ("The same necessity that prompted the
subdivision of political authority, in the creation of cities and towns, to the end that
government should be brought closer to the people in the congested areas, and thus be
able to deal more directly with problems of health, safety, police protection, and public
convenience, progressively demands that government should be further refined and
subdivided, within the limits of its general powers and purposes, to deal with new
conditions, constantly appearing in sharper outline, where community initiative has
failed and authority alone can prevail."). The notion that the police power must change
to meet on-the-ground challenges that cities face harkens back to the framework
principle that the law must be interpreted in a manner that allows for the evolution of
the law to meet changing circumstances. See supra Part II.A.2.d.
196. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-121(b).
197. Id.
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ordinance of the Board of Transportation";1 98 require removal and
disposal of junk cars that are "in an enclosed building" or "any vehicle on
the premises of a business enterprise being operated in a lawful place
and manner if the vehicle is necessary to the operation of the enterprise"
or "any vehicle in an appropriate storage place or depository maintained
in a lawful place and manner by the county"; 9 9 "examine or license a
person holding a license issued by an occupational licensing board of
this State as to the profession or trade that he has been licensed to
practice or pursue by the State";200 adopt rules for the disposal of solid
waste that are contrary to those adopted by the Commission of Public
Health and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources;20 '
charge a fee for the annual registration of mobile homes;202 require the
removal of off-premises, outdoor advertising without paying
compensation to the owners of the advertising, except in certain limited
circumstances; 203 or prohibit the installation of solar panels, except in
certain circumstances.204 The General Assembly sought to restrict the
police power of the counties in each of these instances, and did so
expressly. There exists no such restriction on the ability of counties to
regulate overcrowded schools, by the imposition of a school impact fee
or otherwise. Such legislative silence, in light of the expansive grant of
authority pursuant to the police power and the existence of certain
express, legislative restrictions on that power, suggests the General
Assembly did not intend to prohibit counties from regulating
overcrowded schools pursuant to the police power.
2.

The Zoning and Subdivision Powers

North Carolina's courts have recognized the power to zone and
subdivide land as a particular species of the police power.205 The
General Assembly has codified the authority of local governments to

198. Id.
199. Id. § 153A-132(h).
200. Id. § 153A-134.
201. Id. § 153A-136(b).
202. Id. § 153A-138.
203. Id. § 153A-143(d).
204. Id. § 153A-144.
205. See County of Durham v. Addison, 136 S.E.2d 600, 602 (N.C. 1964) ('The
presumption is that the zoning ordinance as a whole is a proper exercise of the police
power. .'. ."'(quoting Kinney v. Sutton, 53 S.E.2d 306, 310 (N.C. 1949))).
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exercise this power,206 the purpose of which is to regulate growth,
development, and land use. 0
Zoning, generally speaking, "is the
regulation by a local government entity of the use of land within a given
community, and of the buildings and structures which may be located
thereon,"20 8 and the subdivision power allows local government "the
opportunity not only to review the design of the resulting lots [on
subdivided land] but also to ensure the subdivider provides streets,
utilities, and other public improvements that will be required to serve
the needs of those who purchase the subdivided land."2 09
The statutes granting counties zoning and subdivision authority
explain how these generally defined powers may be exercised. The
zoning power is broad, and, "[flor the purpose of promoting health,
safety, morals, or the general welfare, a county may adopt zoning and
development regulation ordinances."210 Such ordinances may regulate
"the height, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures,
the percentage of lots that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and
other open spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of
buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other
purposes." 1 This list is illustrative, not exclusive.2 12
All zoning regulations must be "reasonable and in the public
interest" and "designed to promote the public health, safety, and general
welfare." 1 To achieve these ends,
the regulations may address, among other things, the following public
purposes: to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding
of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to lessen
206. Counties' powers related to zoning and subdivision of land are codified in Article
18 of Chapter 153A of the North Carolina General Statutes. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A18.
207. See, e.g., Richard D. Ducker, Community Planning, Land Use, and Development,
COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA 25-11 (David M. Lawrence,
ed., 2007) ("Zoning involves the exercise of the state's police power to regulate private
property in order to promote the public health, the public safety, and the general
welfare.").
208. Chrismon v. Guilford County, 370 S.E.2d 579, 583 (N.C. 1988) (internal
citations omitted).
209. Ducker, supra note 207, at 25-21.
210. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-340(a). Again, the overlap between a county's zoning
authority and a county's police power is substantial.
211. Id.
212. See id. § 153A-124 ("The enumeration in this Article or other portions of this
Chapter of specific powers to define, regulate, prohibit, or abate acts, omissions, or
conditions is not exclusive . . .
213. Id. § 153A-341.
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congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, and dangers;
and to facilitate the efficient and adequate provision of transportation,
water, sewage, schools, parks, and other public requirements. 2 14
As for the subdivision power,
a subdivision control ordinance may provide for the orderly growth and
development of the county; for the coordination of transportation
networks and utilities within proposed subdivisions with existing or
planned streets and highways and with other public facilities; for the
dedication or reservation of recreation areas serving residents of the
immediate neighborhood within the subdivision and of rights-of-way or
easements for street and utility purposes . .. ; and for the distribution of

population and traffic in a manner that will avoid congestion and
overcrowding and will create conditions that substantially promote
public health, safety, and the general welfare. 1 5
And just as the specific zoning powers expressly granted to counties
do not represent the limit of the counties' zoning authority,2 1 6 the
enumeration of particular subdivision powers is not exclusive, but
illustrative.217

3.

Public Education

The substantive principles of public education law in North
Carolina are of two kinds, constitutional and statutory.

a.

The Constitution

Article IX of the state constitution sets forth the essential principles
governing public education in North Carolina and states that "schools,
libraries, and the means of education shall forever be encouraged"
because "[rieligion, morality, and knowledge [are] necessary to good
government and the happiness of mankind."1 To provide the "means of
education," the constitution states that "[tihe General Assembly shall
provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system of
free public schools."2 19 This system of public schools is to provide "equal

214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
Id. § 153A-331(a).
See supra note 212.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-124 ("The enumeration in this Article or other

portions of this Chapter of specific powers to define, regulate, prohibit, or abate acts,
omissions, or conditions is not exclusive. . .
218. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
219. Id. art. IX, § 2(1).
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opportunities . .. for all students."220 The General Assembly is also
authorized to "assign to units of local government such responsibility for
the financial support of the free public schools as it may deem
appropriate," 22 1 and "[the governing boards of units of local government
with financial responsibility for public education may use local revenues
to add to or supplement any public school or post-secondary school
program."22 2
In summary, then, the state, by way of the legislature, is obligated
to operate a system of public schools, but legislators may elect to charge
subsidiary units of government with some of the financial obligations
associated with operating public schools.
b.

The General Statutes

The General Assembly has taken advantage of the constitutional
provision allowing it to assign to local governments some of the
responsibility of paying for public education: "It is the policy of the State
of North Carolina that the facilities requirements for a public education
County governments, in
system will be met by county governments."
other words, must cover the cost of building public schools, while state
funds are to be used to pay for schools' operating expenses.224
State law is silent-offering neither express authorization nor
prohibition-as to whether counties may levy school impact fees to
meet their obligation to pay for school facilities. 225 The General
Assembly has expressly limited counties to raising revenue through
taxation "only as specifically authorized," 6 but no such restriction exists

220. Id.

221. Id. art. IX, § 2(2).
222. Id.
223. N.C. GEN. STAT.

§

115C-408(b) (2010).

224. See id. ("[I]t is the policy of the State of North Carolina to provide from State
revenue sources the instructional expenses for current operations of the public school
system as defined in the standard course of study. It is the policy of the State of North
Carolina that the facilities requirements for a public education system will be met by
county governments.").
225. See Union Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Union, 689 S.E.2d 504, 506 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2009) (noting the county relied on general grants of authority related to the police
power and zoning and subdivision power as bases to adopt the school impact fee);
Durham Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Durham, 630 S.E.2d 200, 202 (N.C. Ct. App.
2006) (noting Durham County passed its school impact fee ordinance without express
authorization from the legislature).
226. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-146. School impact fees do not run afoul of this
restriction because they are not taxes. As the Supreme Court of North Carolina has
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on fees associated with maintaining the public schools, by way either of
the police power or the zoning and subdivision power. Construing in
para materia the statutes, on the one hand, governing the funding of
public school facilities, the police power, and the zoning and subdivision
power and, on the other hand, the statute limiting counties' power of
taxation, the conclusion can be fairly reached that in the absence of a
restriction saying otherwise, counties are free to impose school impact
fees so as to meet their obligation to pay for school facilities and as a
valid exercise of the police power, the zoning and subdivision power, or
both.m
C. Achieving Democracy
There remains the question of democracy, the lodestar by which
this Article's analysis is guided and the fundamental basis of its
normative critique of the decisions in Durham Land Owners and Union
Land Owners.
Some scholars who have examined the scope and nature of local
governments' powers in North Carolina have expressly avoided making
value judgments about the distribution of power between the state and
localities and about the normative consequences of power's

explained, a tax is "imposed upon the citizens in common at regularly recurring periods
for the purpose of providing a continuous revenue." Town of Tarboro v. Forbes, 116
S.E. 81, 82 (N.C. 1923). School impact fees are not imposed upon everyone, but upon a
particular class of people; are not imposed over recurring periods, but only once upon
the completion of construction of a new residence; and do not provide a continuous
revenue, but a one-time contribution.
227. See supra note 82 (explaining the interpretive canon of in para materia).
228. The court in Union Land Owners relied, in part, on this tool of statutory
interpretation to invalidate the school impact fee in question. The court construed
statutes that contained express grants of authority in para materia with the more openended grants of statutory authority on which the county relied as the basis of its power
to impose the impact fee. See Union Land Owners Ass'n, 689 S.E.2d at 507 (employing
this canon of interpretation). The court concluded that when the two sets of statutes
were so construed, the absence of express authority to adopt the impact fee in the list of
specific grants of power implied that there could be no such authority granted by the
more generalized, open-ended statutory provisions granting counties zoning and
subdivision authority. See id. The court appeared to misuse this tool of interpretation by
using it not to harmonize various statutory provisions, but to read out of the statutes
entirely numerous provisions that require broad construction of grants of authority to
local government. See supra note 82 (noting that construing statutes in para materia
requires a court to harmonize statutes, if possible).
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These scholars have instead struck the pose of
distribution.2 2 9
disinterested empiricists.
But empiricism is deficient when examining a subject charged with
unavoidable ethical and normative components, as our constitution and
structure of government must be. Efficiency or efficacy-that with
which empiricists are most concerned-were not those considerations
with which North Carolina's founders were most concerned. They were
concerned with democracy. This Article's criterion for assessing these
judicial decisions, therefore, is a means of examining the legitimacy of
government action that is as old as the state itself.
1.

The Constitutionof 1776

Two separate documents comprised North Carolina's first
constitution, ratified in 1776. The first document was the Declaration of
Rights, which began by declaring it was "made by the Representatives of
the Freemen of the State of North Carolina."230 The opening words of
the state's first governing charter therefore stated an unequivocal
An
dedication to representative self-government, or democracy.
affirmation of democracy as the central concern of the state's founders
followed, as the first right declared by those assembled was "[tihat all
This
political power is vested in and derived from the people only."'
was followed by the assertion "[tihat the people of this State ought to
have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the internal government
and police thereof."23 2 Subsequent provisions of the Declaration of
Rights declared, for example, that the state's power was to be separated
between legislative, executive, and judicial branches;233 that laws would

229. See, e.g., Frayda S. Bluestein, Do North Carolina Local Governments Need Home
Rule?, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1983, 2020 (2006) ("The question addressed in this Article
intentionally sidesteps the value-laden assessment of whether home rule is good or bad,
either in general or in terms of particular social issues. Instead, the question is whether
North Carolina local governments need home rule to improve flexibility, efficiency, and
predictability in carrying out the functions for which they are responsible."). Questions
of flexibility, efficiency, and predictability are important, of course, but to focus on such
issues while avoiding normative criteria is to ignore primary considerations so as to focus
on secondary ones.
230. N.C. CONST. decl. of rts. (1776).
231. Id. § 1.
232. Id. § 2.
233. Id. § 4 ("That the legislative, executive and supreme judicial powers of
government, ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other.").
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not be suspended without the consent of the people's representatives;234
that legislative elections would be free; 235 and that taxation would not be
imposed without the consent of the people's representatives.2 36 Much of
the rest of the document was dedicated to enumerating those civil
liberties possessed by the people.237
The second document that comprised the Constitution of 1776 was
the constitution proper, which provided for the state's framework of
government.238 The government established by the constitution was
comprised of a representative, bicameral legislature, both houses of
which were to be "dependent on the people."239 Much of the rest of the
constitution prescribed the manner in which the legislature was to
operate, all of it stemming from the first, fundamental rule that the
people themselves, through their representatives, were to govern.24 0
2.

The Constitutionof 1868

The theme of democracy continued in the post-Civil War
constitution adopted in 1868. "[T]he people of the State of North

234. Id. § 5 ("That all powers of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by any
authority, without consent of the representatives of the people, is injurious to their
rights, and ought not to be exercised.").
235. Id. § 6 ("That elections of members to serve as representatives in general
assembly ought to be free.").
236. Id. § 16 ("That the people of this State ought not to be taxed, or made subject to
the payment of any impost or duty, without the consent of themselves, or their
representatives in General Assembly, freely given.").
237. Id. § 7 ("That, in all criminal prosecutions, every man has a right to be informed
of the accusation against him, and to confront the accusers and witnesses with other
testimony, and shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself."); id. § 15 ("That
the freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and, therefore, ought
never to be restrained."); id. § 19 ("That all men have a natural and unalienable right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences.").
238. Before turning to the work of setting up a governmental structure, the preamble
to the constitution took time to criticize King George III for his behavior towards the
colonies and then declared, in accord with the pursuit of democracy, the need to
"fram[e] a constitution, under the authority of the people, most conducive to their
happiness and prosperity." N.C. CONST. pmbl. (1776).
239. Id. § 1.
240. Id. § 2 (setting forth the membership of the senate); id. § 3 (setting forth the
membership of the house); id. § 9 (describing which people shall be eligible to vote for
members of the General Assembly); id. § 13 (explaining that the legislature shall appoint
members of the supreme court); id. § 44 (declaring the Declaration of Rights a part of the
constitution).
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Carolina"2 1 adopted a revised declaration of rights as the first article of
The first enumerated right echoed the nation's
the new constitution.
Declaration of Independence: "That we hold it to be self-evident that all
men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, the
enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit of
happiness."24 3 This proclamation was followed by the affirmation "t] hat
all political power is vested in, and derived from the people; all
government of right originates from the people, is founded upon their
will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole,"4 4 which
was followed by the declaration "[that the people of this State have the
inherent, sole, and exclusive right of regulating the internal government
and police thereof,"245 at least within the bounds of the national
constitution. 246 As with North Carolina's original declaration of rights,
the Constitution of 1868 opened with an unambiguous dedication to
democracy.
Other, more particular provisions of the revised Declaration of
Rights, many of them borrowed from the version approved in 1776,
aimed to protect civil liberties in the service of democracy, including
provisions requiring the separation of powers; 47 banning suspension of
the state's laws without the consent of the people's representatives; 248
and guaranteeing free elections, 24 9 jury trials, 25 0 and freedom of the

presS21 and religion.m
241. See N.C. CONST. pmbl. (1868) ("We the people of the State of North
Carolina....").
242. Id. art. I (incorporating the Declaration of Rights into the first article of the new
constitution).
243. Id. art. 1, § 1.
244. Id. art. I, § 2.
245. Id. art. I, § 3.
246. Id.
247. Id. art. I, § 8 ("The Legislative, Executive, and Supreme judicial powers of the
government, ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other.").
248. Id. art. 1, § 9 ("All power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by any
authority, without the consent of the representatives of the people, is injurious to their
rights, and ought not to be exercised.").
249. Id. art. I, § 10 ("All elections ought to be free.").
250. Id. art. I, § 19 ("In all controversies at law respecting property, the ancient mode
of trial by jury is one of the best securities of the rights of the people, and ought to
remain sacred and inviolable.").
251. Id. art. 1, § 20 ("The freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty,
and therefore ought to never be restrained, but every individual shall be held responsible
for the abuse of the same.").
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The remainder of the 1868 constitution established a representative
legislature 53 and popularly elected executive officers254 and judges. 255
Dedication to democracy was also present in a number of other
constitutional provisions, including those related to taxation 256 and
voting, 257 as well as to the means by which the constitution was to be
amended. 5
The Constitution of 1868 also recognized a role for local
governments in the work of democracy. The constitution created five
commissioners to serve in each county2 " and instructed, "It shall be the
duty of the Commissioners to exercise a general supervision and control
of the penal and charitable institutions, schools, roads, bridges, levying
of taxes and finances of the county, as may be prescribed by law." 260
From at least the middle of the nineteenth century, then, the state's
highest law required county officials-those officials closest to the
people-to perform the same kind of work county commissioners are
expected to perform today at the beginning of the twenty-first century,
including "exercise[ing] a general supervision and control ...
the . .. schools . . . as may be prescribed by law."26 1

of

252. Id. art. I, § 26 ("All men have a natural and unalienable right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences, and no human
authority should, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of
conscience.").
253. Id. art. II, H§ 1-8 (establishing a bicameral legislature, setting forth the
composition of each, and requiring popular apportionment of legislative seats).
254. Id. art. III, § 1 (establishing popular election for governor, lieutenant governor,
secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, superintendent of public works, superintendent of
public instruction, and attorney general).
255. Id. art. IV, § 26 (establishing popular election for justices of the state supreme
court and superior court judges).
256. Id. art. V, § 1 ("The General Assembly shall levy a capitation tax on every male
inhabitant of the State over twenty-one and under fifty years of age, which shall be equal
on each, to the tax on property valued at three hundred dollars in cash.").
257. Id. art. VI, § 1 (granting the vote to all males at least twenty-one years old who
were either born in the United States or who have been naturalized, and who have
resided in the state for at least a year and the county in which they wish to vote for at
least thirty days).
258. Id. art. XIII, § 2 (establishing the means for popular amendment to the
constitution).
259. Id. art. VII, § 1 ("In each county, there shall be elected, biennially, by the
qualified voters thereof, as provided for the election of members of the General
Assembly, the following officers: A Treasurer, Register of Deeds, Surveyor, and Five
Commissioners.").
260. Id. art. VII, § 2.
261. Id.
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The subject of public education also received extensive treatment in
the Constitution of 1868, which declared, "[rieligion, morality, and
knowledge being necessary to good government and [the] happiness of
mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be
encouraged."262 The legislature, to provide the means of education, was
to "provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system
of Public Schools, wherein tuition shall be free of charge to all the
children of the State between the ages of six and twenty-one."263 County
commissioners who failed to keep the schools in their jurisdiction open
for at least four months per year were "liable to indictment." 264 The
state's highest law, since it first addressed at length in 1868 the role of
public education in North Carolina, thus looked to local officials to play
an important role in the work of providing public education, which
again speaks to the constitution's dedication to self-government and the
ability of local officials to best represent the interests of their fellow
citizens, both generally and in the arena of public education specifically.
3.

The Constitution of 1971

Much of the Constitution of 1868 remained in the constitution
proposed to and ratified by the people in 1970, and in effect since 1971.
The document opens with a Declaration of Rights that identifies
man as being naturally free 65 and government's legitimacy as coming
from the people. 6 6 The people are recognized as possessing "the
inherent, sole, and exclusive right of regulating the internal government
[of the state] and the police thereof."2 67 Many of the substantive
provisions of the 1868 Declaration of Rights were repeated in the 1971
declaration.

262. Id. art. IX, § 1.
263. Id. art. IX, § 2.
264. Id. art. IX, § 3.
265. See N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (1971) ("We hold it to be self-evident that all persons
are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights;
that among these are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the
pursuit of happiness.").
266. See id. art. 1, § 2 ("All political power is vested in and derived from the people; all
government of right originates from the people, is founded upon their will only, and is
instituted solely for the good of the whole.").
267. Id. art. I, § 3.
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Under the current constitution, members of the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches are still to be elected by the people, 6
and citizens at least eighteen years of age are to have the right to vote.269
Provision is made for the creation of local governments by the General
Assembly, 2 70 including for the granting of "powers and duties to
counties, cities and towns, and other governmental subdivisions as [the
legislature] may deem advisable."27 Dedication to self-government at
the local level is therefore retained in the current constitution.
As for education, the Constitution of 1971 continues to link
education to "good government and the happiness of mankind"2 72 and
therefore mandates that "schools, libraries, and the means of education
shall forever be encouraged." 7
In an important change from the
previous constitution, "[tihe General Assembly may assign to units of
local government such responsibility for the financial support of the free
public schools as it may deem appropriate."7
The legislature is not
required to impose any such obligation on local governments, but, to the
degree the General Assembly does, local governments are obligated to
provide revenue to the public schools sufficient to meet local
governments' responsibility to "support ... the free public schools." 7
4.

The Courts and Democracy

North Carolina's courts, perhaps heeding the state constitution's
long-standing admonition "Itihat a frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty,"276

268. Id. art. II, Hi 3, 5 (providing for popular election of legislators); see also id. art.
Ill, H§ 2, 7 (providing for popular election of members of the executive branch); id. art.
IV, § 16 (providing for popular election of judges).
269. Id. art. VI, § 1 (providing citizens over eighteen years of age the right to vote).
270. Id. art. VII, § 1 ("The General Assembly shall provide for the organization and
government and the fixing of boundaries of counties, cities and towns, and other
governmental subdivisions, and, except as otherwise prohibited by this Constitution,
may give such powers and duties to counties, cities and towns, and other governmental
subdivisions as it may deem advisable.").
271. Id.
272. Id. art. IX, § 1.
273. Id.
274. Id. art. IX, §2(2).
275. Id.
276. N.C. CONST. decl. of rts., § 21 (1776); see also N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 29 (1868) ("A
frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, is absolutely necessary to preserve the
blessings of liberty."); N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 35 (1971) ("A frequent recurrence to
fundamental principles is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty.").
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have regularly relied upon and promoted the idea of democracy when
called upon to interpret the state's laws.
Judicial citation to principles of democracy and self-government can
be found in cases dating back to the first years following independence.
For example, the opinion in a 1794 case involving the state's ability,
without providing the opportunity for a hearing, to secure judgments
against certain receivers of public money paid considerable attention to
the role of the constitution as "that surest palladium of our rights,"" a
document that declared
that the rights of the people should be proclaimed and handed down to
posterity-that this solemn declaration should be a monument of them,
to keep the genius of freedom alive, and to impel posterity by this lesson
left them by their ancestors, at some future day to erect again the
standard of liberty.278
Liberty was to be safeguarded so "that the people of North Carolina have
a right to be governed by their own laws"2 79 and to make clear "that the
people of this state ought to have the sole and exclusive right of
regulating the internal government and police thereof-by all which
they mean to vindicate the sovereignty of this country, and the inherent
right of the people thereof to govern themselves." 280 The constitution's
regard for self-government was not merely words on a page, but a
dedication to a manner of communal living.
Similarly, in the 1875 case of People ex rel. Van Bokkelen v.
Canady18 1 involving a dispute over which persons were entitled to vote
in a city election,282 the court began its opinion: "Our government is
founded on the will of the people. Their will is expressed by the
The court's analysis went on to examine the statute under
ballot."8
review by comparing it with specific constitutional language regarding
the qualifications of voters, 2 but the court's analysis was animated by
the overarching goal of the constitution: self-government.
277. State v. _, 2 N.C. 28, 30 (1794). This case does not identify a defendant. It is
not clear from the opinion whether the defendant's name is lost to history or if the
opinion in the case was issued without a named defendant being haled into court.
278. Id. at 31.
279. Id. at 32.
280. Id.
281. People ex rel. Van Bokkelen v. Canady, 73 N.C. 198 (1875).
282. See id. at 222 (explaining that the statute under review attempted to alter the
voting qualifications for city elections in Wilmington, North Carolina).
283. Id. at 220.
284. See id. at 221-22 (reviewing several constitutional provisions relevant to the
case's inquiry).
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More recent decisions have returned to the theme of democracy. In
a case involving a challenge to state legislative districts as impermissibly
cutting across county lines, the court declared,
"It is through [counties], mainly, that the powers of government reach
and operate directly upon the people, and the people direct and control
the government.

. .

. It is through [counties], in large degree, that the

people enjoy the benefits arising from local self-government, and foster
and perpetuate that spirit of independence and love of liberty that
withers and dies under the baneful influence of centralized systems of
government."285
The court in that case did not engage in a value-free analysis of the
relevant constitutional principles, 2 86 but instead analyzed the germane
constitutional language with an eye on the purpose towards which such
language aimed, namely self-government. After reviewing the many
ways in which county governments touched the lives of residents,"' the
court said, "[n] ot surprisingly, people identify themselves as residents of
their counties and customarily interact most frequently with their
government at the county level."
It follows that the unit of
government in most immediate contact with the state's residents be a
government in which democracy is honored, an argument the court
implicitly accepted when it struck down legislative districts that diluted
the ability of residents to effectively influence lawmakers by dividing
counties into multiple state legislative districts.
285. Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377, 386 (N.C. 2002) (quoting White v.
Comm'rs of Chowan County, 90 N.C. 437, 438 (1884)).
286. The constitutional provisions in play were the so-called "Whole County
Provisions." See id. at 381-382 (collectively referring to the requirement of article II,
section 3(3) of the constitution that "mlo county shall be divided in the formation of a
senate district" and the requirement of article II, section 5(3) of the constitution that
"Inlo county shall be divided in the formation of a representative district" as the "Whole
County Provision").
287. See id. at 386 (identifying the many ways county governments affect residents,
including law enforcement, soil and water conservation, and public education).
288. Id.
289. See, e.g., id. at 383 (noting that the residents of Pender County, totaling 41,082
under the 2000 census-more than 25,000 fewer residents than the ideal population for
a state house district-were "distributed among eight legislative districts incorporating
fourteen different counties" and that Pender County officials believed this plan would
deny county residents "'the opportunity to present a cohesive voice to address the
particular needs it faces as a low wealth, rapid growth county"'). The purpose of
achieving democracy-or, more accurately, protecting individual liberty so as to
ultimately better safeguard democracy-also animated the court's decision in Corum v.
Univ. of N.C., 413 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. 1992), when the court held that there existed under
the constitution a direct cause of action against government officials for violating the
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The judiciary's dedication to democracy over the years can be seen
in a number of contexts, including those of local government
authority, 9 0 criminal law, 29 1 internal improvements,2 9 2 education,29 1
state constitutional right to free speech. See, e.g., id. at 289 ("The provision of our
Constitution which protects the right of freedom of speech is self-executing. Therefore,
the common law, which provides a remedy for every wrong, will furnish the appropriate
action for the adequate redress of a violation of that right. This great bulwark of liberty,
[freedom of speech,] is one of the fundamental cornerstones of individual liberty and one
of the great ordinances of our Constitution.").
290. See, e.g., Washington v. McLawhorn, 75 S.E.2d 402, 405 (N.C. 1953) ("Counties
are subdivisions of the State, established for the more convenient administration of
justice and to assure a large measure of local self-government."); S. Ry. Co. v.
Mecklenburg County, 56 S.E.2d 438, 440 (N.C. 1949) ("[Counties] are subdivisions of
the State, established for the more convenient administration of government and to
assure a large measure of local self-government. . . . Generally speaking [counties]
possess such governmental powers as are necessary to be exercised in the enforcement of
the law, the maintenance of the peace, and the protection of the people within their
boundaries, subject to such limitations as the Legislature may deem it wise to impose.");
Smalley v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Rutherford County, 29 S.E. 904, 904 (N.C. 1898) ("The
imposition complained of by the plaintiff is the imposition necessarily imposed by the
principle that the majority must rule. A government which protects must control, and
when it does so through the will of the majority, there is no wrong done, except the rule
that minorities must submit to the will of the majority.").
291. See, e.g., State v. Warren, 114 S.E.2d 660, 663 (N.C. 1960) ("The basic
constitutional principle of personal liberty and freedom embraces the right of the
individual to be free to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by his
Creator, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, and
to pursue any legitimate business, trade or vocation. This precept emphasizes the
dignity, integrity and liberty of the individual, the primary concern of our democracy. It
is the antithesis of the totalitarian concept of government."); State v. Harris, 6 S.E.2d 854,
865-66 (N.C. 1940) ("We violate no precedent in referring to the important function
these guaranties of personal liberty [to pursue a lawful calling] perform in determining
the form and character of our Government. They are not accidental or unrelated. They
fall into the pattern of democracy upon which our institutions are founded. In no other
part of the fundamental law is caught and held the aspiration for this sort of freedom. If
those whose duty it is to uphold tradition falter in the task, these guaranties may be
defeated temporarily, or permanently lost through obsolescence."); State v. Norris, 173
S.E. 14, 18 (N.C. 1934) ("This is a government founded on the consent of the governed,
a democracy, the best so far devised by the human family. The will of the majority under
constitutional limitations, the supreme law of the land."); State v. Tisdale, 58 S.E. 998,
1000 (N.C. 1907) (Wallker, J., concurring) ("We live not under a king or a potentate,
but in a democracy-the best form, we think, of all government, where every man has an
equal chance, or should have, before the law. . . ."); State v. Ray, 42 S.E. 960, 962 (N.C.
1902) (Clark, J., dissenting) ("As was well said by Uudge Daniel] in Hellen v. Noe, 25
N.C. 493[, 499 (1843)], with that confidence in the capacity of the people for selfgovernment and ability to regulate for the best their own local matters, which marked
the utterances of that Court: 'If a majority of the citizens of the town deem the ordinance
impolitic or injurious to the people of the corporation, they have the power in their own
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hands to remedy the evil; but we cannot say that this ordinance is either against the
general law or is in itself unreasonable.' The people are the best judges of their own
interest and wishes, and, as Judge Daniel says, the correction should be left to them,
unless an ordinance is on its face in violation of some statute enacted by the will of the
law-making power of the whole state, or is so unreasonable in its nature as to be beyond
the police power confided to the municipality by virtue of the general statute.").
292. See, e.g., Carlyle v. State Highway Comm., 136 S.E. 612, 624-25 (N.C. 1927)
(Clarkson, J., concurring) ("It took eight years before the surrender at Yorktown to
make good that the divine right of kings to rule was at an end. I believe that this State
will never recede from the principle, not only to make the 'world' but 'North Carolina'
safe for democracy. No administrative body appointed by the law-making body with
definite and fixed duties, by judicial decision can be given a monopoly of power and
destroy any road, mapped, taken over and going through the county seats in the 100
counties of the State and the principal towns."); Norfolk S. R.R. Co. v. Reid, 121 S.E. 534,
536 (N.C. 1924) (quoting Caldwell v. Justices of the County of Burke, 57 N.C. 323, 324
(1858)) ('From time immemorial the counties, parishes, towns and territorial
subdivisions of the country have been allowed in England, and, indeed, required to lay
It is most convenient that the local
rates on themselves for local purposes.
establishments and police should be sustained in that matter; and, indeed, to the interest
taken in them by the inhabitants of the particular districts, and the information upon the
law and public matters generally thereby diffused through the body of the people, has
been attributed by profound thinkers much of that spirit of liberty and capacity for selfgovernment through representatives which has been so conspicuous in the mother
country and so eminently distinguishes the people of America."'); Bd. of Supervisors Pub.
Roads of Pactolus Township v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Pitt County, 86 S.E. 520, 521 (N.C.
1915) ('In short, this Court is not capable of controlling the exercise of power on the
part of the General Assembly, or of the county authorities, and it cannot assume to do so
without putting itself in antagonism as well to the General Assembly as to the county
authorities and erecting a despotism of five men, which is opposed to the fundamental
principles of our Government and the usages of all times past."' (quoting Brodnax v.
Groom, 64 N.C. 244, 250 (1870))).
293. See, e.g., Dilday v. Beaufort County Bd. of Educ., 148 S.E.2d 513, 522 (N.C.
1966) ("Democracy is based upon the premise that the citizenry, if educated and
enlightened, will do what is required of it to preserve government by law. The
preservation of our form of government, therefore, depends upon an adequate system of
public education."); Collie v. Comm'rs of Franklin County, 59 S.E. 44, 46 (N.C. 1907)
("'Schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged,' says the
Constitution. Why? Because they foster religion and morality, which, with knowledge,
are necessary to good government."); id. at 47 (Walker, J., concurring) ("In Article IX [of
the constitution] the very first declaration is, that religion, morality and knowledge lie at
the very foundation of all good government. And who can doubt the correctness of this
proposition? They are essential prerequisites, if I may so speak. Without intelligence,
properly cultivated and directed, good government would be almost impossible,
especially where the particular form of State policy depends so largely upon the will of
the people, as it does in a representative democracy."); id. at 50 ("What is more essential
to good government and the peace and good order of society than that the voter should
be able to intelligently decide for himself upon all public questions which concern the
general welfare, and to select honest and capable men to represent him in the offices and
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elections disputes,294 loans to veterans, 295 and the consequences of the
Civil War.296 In each of these contexts and more, the judiciary breathed
life into the dedication to democracy enshrined in the state's highest law.
This is not to say that the courts' invocations of democracy have always
resulted in decisions that residents of the twenty-first century would
regard as right or good,2 97 nor is it ignore the tension that exists between
democracy-as-majority-rule and democracy-as-individual-liberty.298 It is
councils of the State?"); County Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Cherokee County, 63
S.E. 724, 728 (N.C. 1909) ("Both our constitutional provisions and general legislation on
the subject [of providing local funding for public schools] establish and approve the
principle and policy of local regulation for these matters of local concern, not to be
departed from, except in cases of great and overruling necessity; and a statute should
never be construed as infringing upon this principle of self-government unless explicit in
terms and clearly sanctioned by the Constitution.").
294. See, e.g., Swaringen v. Poplin, 191 S.E. 746, 747 (N.C. 1937) ("Our government
is founded on the consent of the governed. A free ballot and a fair count must be held
inviolable to preserve our democracy. In some countries the bullet settles disputes, in
our country the ballot.").
295. See, e.g., Hinton v. Lacy, 137 S.E. 669, 678 (N.C. 1927) ("Like the ex-soldier who
argued this case for plaintiff, the American soldier responded to the call to colors, with a
noble purpose to destroy the divine right of kings to rule, threatening the very life of the
Republic, and to enthrone democracy-that equal rights and opportunities might prevail
among all the people of the world, and that aristocracy of character may be the goal....
Like the Crusaders of old, the heart of the Nation was stirred as never before, with the
idea of service and sacrifice, that this gigantic struggle might end war by destroying
autocracy and making democracy.").
296. See, e.g., Varner v. Arnold, 83 N.C. 206, 210-11 (1880) ("The Federal
Constitution, the only bond of union among the States, though its voice was hushed and
its power suspended amid the din of arms, at the close of the conflict reasserted its
supremacy over all the States as amply as before the attempted rupture. Whatever
necessity may have been supposed to exist for placing these States, in their transition
from war to peace, under the supervisory control of military commanders, it would be
difficult to find any warrant in the Constitution for conferring the powers, had Congress
so intended, they assumed to exercise over the legitimate action of the civil authorities.
Self-government is the vital principle of our institutions, National and State, and the
theory of both governments . . . 'is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power
anywhere."' (quoting Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 663 (1875)).
297. See, e.g., Dilday, 148 S.E.2d at 523 (Lake, J., concurring) (describing practice of
racially segregated schools as "tested and proved to be wise and beneficial by over sixtyfive years of experience in this State"); id. at 523 (suggesting the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States that racially segregated schools violates the Fourteenth
Amendment was a step towards "the smothering of freedom beneath the robes of a
judicial despotism").
298. See, e.g., State v. Warren, 114 S.E.2d 660, 664 (N.C. 1960) ("But liberty and
freedom in an orderly democratic society are of necessity relative terms. Government is
necessary to the preservation of liberty. And government must be vested with sufficient
power and authority to maintain its own existence and provide for the general welfare.
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only to say that the imperative of democracy, even when misapplied or
misunderstood, has always had a place, and properly so, in the
interpretation of North Carolina's laws.
5.

Dedication to Democracy

A review of North Carolina's highest law throughout history and
across the generations, as well as the judicial interpretations of the state's
governing charters, demonstrates that the achievement and promotion of
democracy are proper criteria by which to assess and critique the
decisions issued in Durham Land Owners and Union Land Owners. The
work of government is founded on certain normative principles that
unavoidably require assessment and application when reviewing the
work of government. In North Carolina, the central, guiding principle
of government can be handily summarized as the promotion of selfgovernment. It is, in a word, democracy.
The people's adoption of democracy as the state's highest end
necessarily represents the selection of some values over others and the
endorsement of certain normative arrangements over their opposites. To
review the work of government without regard to the people's normative
choices, as some do," is to engage, at best, in an incomplete analysis
and, at worst, in a perverse one; such an analysis can provide insight
into whether a policy "works" in a narrow, instrumental sense-are
these means efficient or effective?-but not in the sense that is most
important, that of determining whether and how well the work of
government is achieving those ends the people have identified as most
important. It is in this normative sense, therefore, that the court of
appeals' invalidation of local school impact fees should be examined and
critiqued, at least in part.

The police power of the State is exercised for the protection of the health, safety, morals,
comfort and quiet of all persons and the protection of property within the
commonwealth."); State v. Harris, 6 S.E.2d 854, 865 (N.C. 1940) ("Resort to the police
power to exclude persons from an ordinary calling, finding justification only by the
existence of a vague public interest, often amounting to no more than a doubtful social
convenience, is collectivistic in principle, destructive to the historic values of these
guaranties [of individual liberty], and contrary to the genius of the people who did all
that was humanly possible to secure them in a written constitution.").
299. See supra note 229.
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III. TAKING ANOTHER LOOK AT THE DURHAM AND UNION COUNTY
ORDINANCES

What if the court of appeals had approached the school impact fee
cases more keenly aware of the full range of interpretive and substantive
principles relevant to the cases, and then applied those principles in a
manner consistent with the ultimate aim of self-government that the
people of North Carolina have chosen for themselves?
A. The Framework Questions
The first step in analyzing the validity of the school impact fees
adopted by Durham and Union Counties is to determine how the
ordinances should be analyzed. Put differently, before answering the
substantive question of whether the counties exceeded their authority
when they adopted the ordinances, the threshold question of how to
perform the work of interpreting the ordinances must be answered.
It is an undisputed, bedrock principle in North Carolina that as a
general rule, local governments have only those powers granted to them
by the General Assembly.300 To note this axiom, however, is only the
first step of a proper inquiry into how to interpret a local government's
claim to power; reference to it, without more, raises more questions than
it answers, and certainly cannot stand in the place of analysis.
The relationship between state government and local governments
in North Carolina was governed until the 1970s by the judge-made,
common law rule known as Dillon's Rule.o1 State grants of power to
local governments were limited and narrow under Dillon's Rule. 302 In
the 1970s, the General Assembly abandoned Dillon's Rule and adopted a
statutory rule of construction that mandated grants of power by the state
to local governments be broadly construed.
This statutory command
maintained the rule that local governments' powers were limited to those
granted to them,3 but it reversed the rule that local governments'
powers were to be narrowly construed.
So whereas the powers of local
government were limited and narrow under Dillon's Rule, local

300. See supra notes 22-23, 71 and accompanying text. But see supra Part II.A.2.e
(explaining that the legislature may not modify certain, direct grants of power made by
the people to local governments).
301. See supra Part II.A.l.a.
302. See supra Part II.A.1.a.
303. See supra Part II.A.1.b.
304. See supra notes 129-42.
305. See id.
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governments' powers are limited but broad under the current statutory
command.
It follows from this rule of broad construction that the absence of
an express, legislative grant of authority allowing a local government to
exercise a particular power in a particular manner does not necessarily
mean the exercise of power in that manner is beyond the authority of the
local government. The legislature has said that local governments may
exercise not only those powers expressly granted to them, but that
"grants of power shall be construed to include any powers that are
reasonably expedient to the exercise of the [expressly granted] power."306
The test for whether a local government possesses an implied power is
therefore not necessity, either strictly or loosely defined, but reasonable
expedience or, put differently, whether the implied power could be
reasonably determined by the local government to be an appropriate
manner of exercising an express grant of authority or achieving an end
aimed at by an express power or that an express duty requires.307
This reading of the broad construction statute is the law's natural
one, given the text of the statute, and it is an approach to the statute that
asks two questions: did the legislature grant some power or assign some
duty to the local government to regulate or govern the area of activity
touched by the local regulation or ordinance under review, and, if so,
does the local regulation or ordinance represent a reasonably expedient
manner of exercising an express power or achieving an end at which an
express power aims or an express duty requires?30" Affirmative answers
to both questions would mean the local government's exercise of an
implied power was proper. Answering either question in the negative
would mean the local government exceeded its authority.
The operative question, then, in the context of a school impact fee
ordinance, is whether adoption of the ordinance could be reasonably
deemed by a board of county commissioners as a reasonably appropriate
adjunct to an expressly delegated power or an appropriate means 6f
achieving some expressly assigned duty. It is within this interpretive
framework that the relevant substantive laws must be considered.
Other rules of interpretation inform an analysis of the school
impact fee ordinances and help to round out an interpretive framework
that serves democracy.

306. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-4 (2010).
307. See supra notes 117-23.
308. See supra notes 117-23.
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First, Durham and Union Counties go into court enjoying a
presumption that the ordinances are constitutional. 3 09 This presumption
does not bar the courts from striking down an invalid ordinance, but it
does mean judges should make all reasonable, good faith efforts to
square the challenged ordinances with the proper exercise of power by
the people's representatives. To do otherwise would be to demonstrate
insufficient regard for the privileged place of self-government in the legal
framework of the state.
Regard for self-government also justifies the interpretive rule that
the wisdom of a legislative enactment is beyond the judiciary's review,
an additional advantage the counties bring to court. The courts' review
of policies enacted by the representatives of the people is not concerned
with whether the policy is effective or efficient, but only whether such
enactments are arbitrary.31 A local ordinance that is not arbitrary must
withstand judicial review. 312 The courts must accept that the people are
free to adopt bad laws.
309. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
310. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
311. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
312. This rule of interpretation perhaps goes less to the question of whether Durham
and Union Counties had the power to adopt the school impact fee ordinances and more
to another issue raised by those challenging the ordinances, but not reached by the
courts: that the ordinances violated the Law of the Land Clause of the North Carolina
Constitution. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19 (1971) ("No person shall be taken, imprisoned,
or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any
manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land. No person
shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be subjected to
discrimination by the State because of race, color, religion, or national origin."). The
Law of the Land Clause is the state analog to the Due Process Clause and Equal
Protection Clause found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See N.C. Bd. of Mortuary Science v. Crown Memorial Park, L.L.C., 590
S.E.2d 467, 469 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) ("Our Supreme Court often considers the 'law of
the land' and 'due process of law' to be synonymous."). The interpretive rule that a court
may not invalidate an unwise law, but only an arbitrary one, echoes the standard of
review that would apply to the school impact fee ordinances were the courts to examine
the ordinances through the lens of the Law of the Land Clause. A law challenged as a
violation of the Law of the Land Clause will be upheld so long as the law aims to achieve
a legitimate government objective and the means employed by the law to achieve the
objective are reasonable. See id. at 469-70. A law reviewed under this test is presumed
to be constitutional. See id. at 470. This deferential test would be the appropriate one
with which to review the school impact fee ordinances because the ordinances do not
impinge on any fundamental rights or create suspect classifications. See, e.g., Rhyne v.
K-Mart Corp., 594 S.E.2d 1, 15 (N.C. 2004) ("If the statute at issue affects the exercise of
a fundamental right or classifies a person based upon a suspect characteristic, we apply
strict scrutiny. . . . On the other hand, if the statute impacts neither a fundamental right
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Democracy's preferred position in North Carolina's government also
animates the principle that local government officials should be viewed
by the courts as better situated than judges to understand the problems
facing their communities and the means most appropriate to address
those problems."' Another rule of interpretation requires judges to
Thus, it is not a
allow for ingenuity and progress in the law."
dispositive criticism of an exercise of local government power that no
similarly situated local government has previously exercised the
power,31 5 or that a similarly situated local government has behaved as
though it does not have the authority to exercise the power. 1 6 Such
inaction or action may be relevant, but it is not dispositive, for in a
growing state with an increasingly complex and diverse economy and
population, the law must allow for flexibility and innovation on the part
of the people and their representatives so as to better meet the challenges
created by new circumstances.
Finally, the courts must consider how their task of interpretation is
affected when it is not the state legislature, but the popularly ratified
state constitution itself, that grants local governments authority to
exercise power. Whereas the General Assembly may regulate as it
pleases those powers granted by legislators to local governments,1 the
legislature may not do so as to powers directly granted to local
governments by the constitution.
The legislature's decision to require counties to provide funding for
public school facilities arguably triggers the interpretive principle that
nor a suspect class, we employ the rational basis test."). Those parties challenging the
school impact fee ordinances in Union Land Owners raised objections based on the Law
of the Land Clause, but the court did not address those arguments because the
ordinances were struck down on other grounds. See Union Land Owners Ass'n v.
County of Union, 689 S.E.2d 504, 508 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (noting the court did not
address arguments against the ordinance based on equal protection grounds).
313. See supra Part II.A.2.c.
314. See supra Part II.A.2.d.
315. See In re Declaratory Ruling of the N.C. Comm'r of Ins. Regarding 11 N.C.A.C.
12.0319, 517 S.E.2d 134, 138 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted) (noting that "just because an asserted power is novel and
unprecedented does not mean the action exceeds statutory authority").
316. See Union Land Owners, 689 S.E.2d at 505 (noting Union County unsuccessfully
sought express legislative authority to impose school impact fees in 1998, 2000, and
2005); Durham Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Durham, 630 S.E.2d 200, 202 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2006) (noting Durham County adopted its school impact fee "falfter many years of
rejected petitions to the General Assembly").
317. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
318. See supra Part II.A.2.e.
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grants of authority to local governments made directly by the
constitution may not be regulated or revised by the legislature.3 19
Consider: The constitution commands the government of North
Carolina to provide all students an opportunity to receive a sound basic
education. 3 20 The General Assembly has subsequently passed off to
counties responsibility for meeting part of this duty, that of providing
school facilities that are appropriate for meeting the constitutional
standard.32 1 Thus, counties are required to meet a constitutional duty to
affirmatively provide a part of the opportunity to receive a sound basic
education possessed by all North Carolina school children. It follows
that the legislature cannot impair the counties' efforts to do so and that
the only limitations the counties face in this field are those imposed by
the constitution itself.322
This conclusion is not required as a matter of pure, iron-clad logic.
The counties, while acting in the arena of school funding, exist in a sort
of twilight between an express command of the constitution and a
command entirely within the discretion of the legislature. Counties do
not face a command emanating directly from the constitution itself, but
rather a constitutional command made by way of the General Assembly,
which is free at any time to eliminate or modify the command. But to
credit this distinction as significant is to put form over function. Under
the current statutory regime wherein the legislature has assigned
counties the duty to provide funding for school facilities in a manner
that meets the requirement of the constitutional right to education, the
reality remains that counties, no less than the legislature itself, must
raise revenue and build schools in a manner that complies with the
constitution's mandate. Reasonable grounds exist, therefore, to apply to
the question of school impact fee ordinances the interpretive rule that
the legislature may not modify that which the constitution commands. 3
319. See supra Part II.A.2.e.
320. See Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997) (holding the state
constitution guarantees all school children the right to an opportunity to receive a
"sound basic education").
321. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-408(b) (2010) ("It is the policy of the State of North
Carolina that the facilities requirements for a public education system will be met by
county governments.").
322. See supra Part II.A.2.e. These constitutional limitations would help to ensure
counties do not use arbitrary means of meeting their obligation to provide funding for
school facilities.
323. The legislature is free, of course, to eliminate counties' school-funding
obligations at any time. Were legislators to do so, then this rule of interpretation would
cease to apply to the question of whether counties possess the power under existing law
to impose school impact fees.
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In sum, the proper interpretive posture for a court to adopt as it
undertakes the work of determining whether a local government has
exceeded its authority-and, in particular, whether county governments
under existing law possess the power to impose school impact fees-is
one of significant deference to local governments, thereby requiring a
significant showing by opponents of local governmental action before a
court will invalidate policies adopted through the democratic process.
B.

The Substantive Questions

Even the most democratically
deferential principles of
interpretation will not allow a court to uphold an exercise of local
government power if there is not sufficient substantive law to authorize
the exercise of power. If, for example, local governments are expressly
prohibited by the General Assembly from exercising a particular power,
then the exercise of that power by a local government would plainly be
void. So, too, would a challenge to the exercise of local power clearly
fail if the legislature had expressly granted local governments the power
to so act.
The disputes over school impact fees exist in neither of these forms.
The legislature has granted significant authority to counties to regulate
and govern in the areas of the general welfare, land development, and
public education, but it has not expressly granted counties the power to
impose school impact fees. Neither have legislators expressly prohibited
counties from imposing such fees. The question, therefore, is whether
the powers and duties expressly granted and assigned to counties to
regulate and govern the general welfare, land development, and public
schools are sufficient to serve as authorization for the implied power to
impose school impact fees.
1.

The Police Power

The power of local government to regulate so as to preserve the
health, safety, welfare, and morals of the public-the so-called police
power-is broad.324 The General Assembly's grant of this power to local
governments is sweeping on its face: "A county may by ordinance define,
regulate, prohibit, or abate acts, omissions, or conditions detrimental to
the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens and the peace and dignity of
the county; and may define and abate nuisances."325 This broad power is
made broader by two other statutes.
The first states, "[tihe
324. See supra Part I.B.1.
325. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-121(a).
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enumeration . . . of specific powers to define, regulate, prohibit, or abate

acts, omissions, or conditions is not exclusive, nor is it a limit on the
general authority to adopt ordinances conferred on counties by [the
police power statute] ."326 The General Assembly has therefore made
clear that whether legislators have expressly authorized counties to
pursue regulation of a certain condition, or whether legislators have
expressly allowed counties to regulate a particular condition in a
particular way, is not determinative of the question of whether counties
may so regulate or govern; the legislature's express statement that the
full range of counties' powers are not to be found in the express
language of the statutes suggests the General Assembly's preference was
for robust government at the local level, or at least one not stunted by
unnecessarily narrow interpretations of the powers and duties assigned
to counties. This conclusion is bolstered by the second statute that
expands the already-sweeping police power, the broad construction
statute, which mandates that all grants of power to counties "shall be
broadly construed and grants of power shall be construed to include any
powers that are reasonably expedient to the exercise of the power."3
This troika of statutes makes clear the legislature's intent that counties
be permitted to exercise a far-reaching police power.
The question of whether counties may impose school impact fees
pursuant to the police power is one that asks if county commissioners
could reasonably believe such a fee to be an expedient manner of
regulating the health, safety, or welfare of the counties' residents. Under
a test of reasonableness,
the enactment of a school impact fee
ordinance passes muster. County commissioners could reasonably
conclude that the fee would help generate revenue needed to build
public schools, or slow down the pace of development and thereby
lessen the need for revenue to build new schools, or both.
Commissioners also could have reasonably concluded that imposing the
fee only on new residential construction would be a rational way of
achieving either or both of these aims, either because new residences
would generate students that would increase the demand for public
schools or because slowing the influx of new residents would lessen the
need for new schools.
In the language of the police power statute, the
326. Id. § 153A-124.
327. Id. § 153A-4.
328. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
329. For the same reason that the school impact fees do not violate the due process
component of the Law of the Land Clause, see supra note 313, the classifications created
by the ordinances do not violate the equal protection component of the Law of the Land
Clause. See N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 19 (1971) ("No person shall be denied the equal
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county could reasonably conclude that the "condition" of school
overcrowding was harmful to the "welfare" of the county's residents and
therefore needed to be "regulated" or "abated" by the imposition of a
school impact fee. 330 This is particularly so when the substance of the
police power is examined using the rules of interpretation that place a
premium on democracy and the decisions of the people's
representatives.
The Durham Land Owners court, while acknowledging that the
county relied in part on the police power to justify its ordinance, failed
to analyze the scope of the police power and whether it could support
the county's claim, instead folding discussion of the county's police
power into a discussion of the county's power to exercise zoning and
subdivision authority.333 The county's argument regarding its police
power was effectively ignored by the court.
The court in Union Land Owners addressed the county's claim that
the police power authorized imposition of school impact fees, but only
to wrongly conclude that the police power was irrelevant to the county's
power to impose a school impact fee. 33 ' This was so, the court said,
because regulations touching on land use and development had to find
their authorization in the ordinances granting counties power to adopt
zoning and subdivision regulations.
The court's analysis was flawed primarily by its ignoring the
legislative command that "[tihe enumeration in this Article or other
portions of this Chapter of specific powers to define, regulate, prohibit, or
protection of the laws .... ). A successful equal protection challenge would require a
showing that the classifications drawn by commissioners are "capricious, arbitrary and
unjustified by reason." Rigby v. Clayton, 164 S.E.2d 7, 11 (N.C. 1968). Because the
classifications drawn by commissioners in adopting the school impact fee ordinances are
reasonable, see supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text, the ordinances would
withstand an equal protection challenge.
330. See N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 153A-121(a) (granting counties power to regulate or abate
conditions harmful to the health, safety, or welfare of the public).
331. See supra Part II.A.2.
332. Durham Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Durham, 630 S.E.2d 200, 205 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2006) (noting the county cited the police power as authority to impose a school
impact fee).
333. Id. (referencing and then failing to analyze the county's claim that the police
power authorized its imposition of school impact fees).
334. See Union Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Union, 689 S.E.2d 504, 506 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2009) (stating that to allow the county to use the police power to adopt land or
development regulations would "eviscerate existing limitations on [the county's] zoning
and subdivision regulation [s]").

335. See id.
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abate acts, omissions, or conditions is not exclusive, nor is it a limit on
the general authority to adopt ordinances conferred on counties by [the
police power statute] ."336 The legislature, by adopting this statutory
language, expressly rejected the argument put forward by the Union
Land Owners court in support of its conclusion that the police power
could not be the basis of the county's school impact fee.
Neither the Durham Land Owners nor the Union Land Owners courts
properly construed the scope of the counties' police power and the
degree to which the police power, especially in light of the broad
construction statute3 and democratic principles of interpretation,
could serve as authorization for the imposition of school impact fees.
The commissioners of Durham and Union Counties could have
reasonably concluded that the adoption of school impact fees was
expedient to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the counties by
addressing school overcrowding. This conclusion should have been
enough for the ordinances to withstand judicial scrutiny.
2.

The Zoning and Subdivision Powers

Another grounds on which the counties' school impact fee
ordinances should have received judicial validation is the county power
to regulate land use through the zoning and subdivision of land.
Legislators have given counties broad authority to "adopt zoning and
development regulation ordinance[s]" so as to "promot[e] health, safety,
morals, or the general welfare."'" This is a restatement of the police
power, but in the context of regulating growth and development. 3 To
protect the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, counties'
zoning ordinances may address,
among other things, the following public purposes: to provide adequate
light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue
concentration of population; to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure
safety from fire, panic, and dangers; and to facilitate the efficient and

336. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-124 (2010) (emphasis added).

337. See id. § 153A-4 (mandating that counties' powers be broadly construed).
338. Supra Part II.A.2.
339. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-340(a).

340. See County of Durham v. Addison, 136 S.E.2d 600, 602 (N.C. 1964) (quoting
Kinney v. Sutton, 53 S.E.2d 306, 310 (N.C. 1949) (explaining that the counties' zoning
and subdivision powers are nothing more than a particular brand of the police power)).
It follows from the conclusion that the counties' police power can serve as authority to
impose school impact fees that the counties' power to regulate land use through zoning

and subdivision, as a general matter, can also serve as authority to impose such fees.
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adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and

other public requirements.
Counties are therefore given the general authority to do what the school
impact fees were designed to do: "facilitate the efficient and adequate
provision of . .. schools."342 This should have prevented the courts from
invalidating the fee ordinances.
As for the counties' subdivision powers, subdivision ordinances
may seek to achieve "the orderly growth and development of the
county .. . and .. . the distribution of population and traffic in a manner
that will avoid congestion and overcrowding and will create conditions
that substantially promote public health, safety, and the general
welfare."
County commissioners could have reasonably concluded
that imposing a school impact fee would help achieve "orderly growth
and development," and this, too, should have been enough for the
counties to prevail in the legal disputes over the fees' validity.
It is no bar to such a conclusion that the zoning and subdivision
statutes do not expressly authorize imposition of school impact fees
because "[tihe enumeration ... of specific powers to define, regulate,
prohibit, or abate acts, omissions, or conditions is not exclusive"" and
because the powers granted to counties are to be broadly construed.4 5
The courts in Durham Land Owners and Union Land Owners incorrectly
concluded otherwise.
The Durham Land Owners court ignored the statutory language
giving counties the power to pass zoning regulations so as to "facilitate
the efficient and adequate provision of . .. schools"34 ' and instead
focused on the broad construction statute, as it said the statute was
interpreted by the state supreme court in Homebuilders Association of
34
Charlottev. City of Charlotte.
' The Homebuilders court concluded that
the city, even without express statutory authorization to do so, could
charge user fees for providing certain regulatory services such as
document and permit application reviews 4 ' but, the Durham Land
341. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-341 (emphasis added).
342. Id.
343. Id. § 153A-331(a).
344. Id. § 153A-124.
345. See id. § 153A-4 (mandating that counties' powers be broadly construed).
346. Id. § 153A-341.
347. Durham Land Owners v. County of Durham, 630 S.E.2d 200, 205 (N.C. Ct. App.
2006).
348. Homebuilders Ass'n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45, 49-51
(N.C. 1994) (framing the issue before the court as being whether the city could impose
user fees without express legislative authorization to do so).
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Owners court surmised, "we do not believe the Supreme Court intended
to allow a city or county's zoning power to authorize it to charge a fee
for providing its actual governmental services to the public."349
With this argument, the Durham Land Owners court missed the
point entirely. The issue in Homebuilders was that no statute gave the
city authority to impose fees for providing the services in question.o
The Homebuilders court, by broadly interpreting other substantive grants
of power to the city related to zoning and development, held that the
city's substantive power to govern and regulate in that arena was
sufficient to authorize the imposition of fees for performing various
administrative tasks associated with land development and regulation."'
In other words, the Homebuilders court correctly used the broad
construction statute as a tool to interpret substantive grants of power;
the broad construction statute did nothing by itself.
The Durham Land Owners court, in contrast, seemed to argue that
even though the broad construction statute was interpreted in
Homebuilders to allow the imposition of some administrative fees, the
statute could not serve as the authorization for the county "to charge a
fee for providing its actual governmental services to the public."3 52 This
is undoubtedly true, as the broad construction statute, by itself, cannot
authorize the exercise of any power by local government. The proper
analysis, however, uses the broad construction statute to interpret other,
substantive grants of power to the counties, just as the Homebuilders
court used the broad construction statute to breathe life into substantive
grants of power to the city related to land use and regulation. In other
words, the Durham Land Owners court should have used the broad
construction statute to give meaning to the statutory authorization
counties possess to regulate growth and development so as achieve
orderly growth35 3 and to "facilitate the efficient and adequate provision
of . .. schools."3 " The Durham Land Owners court failed to address this
grant of substantive power. Had it done so, and then used the broad
349. Durahm Land Owners, 630 S.E.2d at 205.
350. See Homebuilders, 442 S.E.2d at 47 (framing the issue before the court as being
whether the city could impose user fees without express legislative authorization to do
so).
351. See id. at 49-51 (identifying those services provided by the city for which fees
were charged).
352. Durham Land Owners, 630 S.E.2d at 205.
353. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-331(a) (2010) (authorizing counties to use the
subdivision power to regulate growth and development to achieve orderly growth).
354. Id. § 153A-341 (authorizing counties to use the zoning power to facilitate the
efficient and adequate provision of schools).
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construction statute to interpret the county's authority pursuant to it,
the court may have correctly concluded that the adoption of the school
impact fee was authorized.
The Union Land Owners court did a better job of acknowledging the
substantive zoning and subdivision statutes relevant to the question
before it, but then failed to properly analyze and apply the statutes. The
court properly recognized that the work of interpretation begins with the
plain language of the statute 5 ' and then noted that counties were
authorized to adopt "'zoning and development regulation ordinances.." to
"'promotle] health, safety, morals, or the general welfare. "'356
Furthermore, the court acknowledged that zoning regulations could
address overcrowding, burdensome population concentration, and the
provision of schools."'
Given the legislative commands that the
enumeration of some specific powers is not to be construed as the
exclusion of other specific powers"' and that counties' powers are to be
broadly construed,"' the court's citation to and recitation of these broad
powers possessed by the county should have been enough to convince
the court to uphold the school impact fee ordinance.
But no. The court began its retreat from a robust interpretation of
the county's zoning and subdivision powers by noting that multiple
statutes addressing the same subject matter are to be interpreted "'in pari
materia to determine and effectuate the legislative intent."360 Using this
interpretive principle, the court concluded,
[A]lthough [the county] is entitled to use its zoning authority to
facilitate the efficient and adequate provisions of schools, it must achieve
this goal using the tools authorized by the zoning statute. While [the
county] clearly seeks to pursue the legislative objective of facilitating the
efficient and adequate provision of schools, the [school impact fee
ordinance] does not utilize any of the zoning powers enumerated in

355. See Union Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Union, 689 S.E.2d 504, 507 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2009) ("'Statutory interpretation properly begins with an examination of the plain
words of the statute' (quoting Three Guys Real Estate v. Harnett County, 480 S.E.2d
681, 683 (N.C. 1997))).
356. Union Land Owners, 689 S.E.2d at 507 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-340(a)).
357. See id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-341).
358. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-124 (stating that the enumeration of particular
regulatory powers is not to be construed as exclusive).
359. See id. § 153A-4 (mandating that counties' powers be broadly construed).
360. Union Land Owners, 689 S.E.2d at 507; see also supra note 82 and accompanying
text (describing the interpretive canon of in para materia).
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[N.C. Gen. Stat. §1 153A-340. Therefore, the ordinance falls outside of
defendant's legislatively granted zoning powers. 361
It is true that section 153A-340 of the North Carolina General Statutes
identifies several objects of regulation, including "the height, number of
stories and size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of lots
that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open spaces,
the density of population, and the location and use of buildings,
structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes. "362
And it is obvious that this list does not mention schools or school impact
fees. For the court, which interpreted this enumeration of regulatory
subjects as an exclusive list of "tools" counties may use when exercising
the zoning power,363 this ended the matter.
The court's construction of the relevant zoning statutes was in
error. The court's analysis ignored the express wishes of the legislature,
which codified that the enumeration of some particular powers
possessed by counties was not to be interpreted as an exclusion of other
powers.3 6 This dictate is the opposite of the court's conclusion that the
"tools" identified in section 153A-340 are the only ones a county may
use when enacting zoning regulations. The court simply got it wrong.
The court similarly erred when determining whether the
subdivision power of the county could act as authority to adopt the
school impact fee ordinance. The court noted that the county relied
both on the general subdivision power 365 and the power to "'provide for
the orderly growth and development of the county .. . in a manner that
will avoid congestion and overcrowding and will create conditions that
substantially promote public health, safety, and the general welfare." 66
Rather than squarely apply these powers, when broadly construed, to the
question of whether the county could properly adopt a school impact
fee, the court simply declared an end to its analysis: "Nevertheless,
They are
'[c]ounties . .. have no inherent legislative powers.
instrumentalities of state government and possess only those powers the

361. Id.
362. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-340(a).
363. See Union Land Owners, 689 S.E.2d at 507 (concluding that those regulatory
"tools" listed in section 153A-340 of the North Carolina General Statutes are exclusive).
364. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-124 (stating that the statutory enumeration of some
of counties' powers was not to be construed as exclusive).
365. See Union Land Owners, 689 S.E.2d at 507-08 (noting the county's reliance on
section 153A-330's grant of power to counties to "regulate the subdivision of land within
its territorial jurisdiction").
366. Id. at 508 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-331(a)).
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General Assembly has conferred upon them.'"6 True enough, but also
irrelevant. The county did point to statutory grants of authority to
support its actions and was not claiming any inherent power for itself,
but the court chose not to analyze the county's claims on the merits,
instead falling back on an undisputed axiom of state law. The court
avoided the question, as well as the answer that seems almost compelled
by the broad grant of power to the county to regulate the subdivision of
land, especially when interpreted in light of the appropriate framework
principles: the school impact fee was properly adopted by the county.
3.

Public Education

The role counties play in funding the construction of schools also
provided sufficient authority for the adoption of the counties' school
impact fee ordinances. This authority has both a constitutional and
statutory component.
The state's constitution declares that "the means of education shall
forever be encouraged" 68 and instructs the General Assembly to provide
"for a general and uniform system of free public schools."369 These
provisions have been interpreted as creating the right of all public school
children in North Carolina to have an opportunity to receive a sound
The constitution allows the legislature, in
basic education.
furtherance of this objective, to assign education-related funding duties
to units of local government. 37 The General Assembly has done so by
making it the public policy of the state that counties be responsible for
generating revenue to pay for school facilities.372 It is this obligation that
ultimately resulted in Union and Durham Counties passing their school
impact fee ordinances.
The imposition on counties of the quasi-constitutional obligation to
fund the construction of school facilities 3 73-especially when considered
in tandem with the counties' ability to regulate and govern development
and land use, a matter intimately connected to the availability of

367. Id. (quoting Five C's, Inc. v. County of Pasquotank, 672 S.E.2d 737, 740 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2009)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
368. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1971).
369. Id. § 2(1).
370. See Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997) (describing the state
constitutional right to receive a sound basic education).
371. See N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(2) (1971).
372. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-408(b) (2010) (assigning counties the responsibility
of paying public schools' facilities costs).
373. See supra notes 319-22 and accompanying text.
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schools-implies the authority of counties to use reasonable methods of
meeting this obligation, without regard to restrictions or modifications
imposed by the legislature.37" This conclusion also accords with the
mandate that local government powers be broadly construed. 7
Neither the Durham Land Owners court nor the Union Land Owners
court gave this argument the attention it deserved. The court in Durham
Land Owners summarily disposed of the argument in three sentences:
The County argues that when 'there is a constitutional mandate to
provide an adequate education combined with the constitutional
guarantee to use revenues to fund these constitutional mandates, the
common law provides the authority to raise funds to meet the
constitutional requirements imposed on counties.' We cannot agree.
Considering that counties cannot act, in particular generate revenue
from the public, without some form of statutory authority, the County's
common law argument is plagued with shortcomings.3 76
The court stopped its argument there, never explaining the
shortcomings it detected or the reasons why generating revenue "in
particular" needed some form of express statutory authorization. This is
assertion, not analysis.
The court failed to appreciate that when the constitution itself
lodges some authority and duty in local governments, the legislature is
powerless to revise or modify the power or obligation so assigned;377 that
the constitution protects the right of all school children to an
opportunity to receive a sound basic education;3 1 that the constitution
allows the General Assembly to assign some part of meeting this
obligation to local governments;379 and that legislators have done so by
assigning counties the duty to provide funds for school construction.3 o
It reasonably follows that counties may use reasonable means to raise
revenue to build schools. To be sure, no iron-clad logic compels this
conclusion, but this conclusion seems to more faithfully adhere to the

374. See supra Part IL.A.2.e.
375. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-4 (mandating counties' powers be broadly
construed).
376. Durham Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Durham, 630 S.E.2d 200, 206 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2006) (internal punctuation omitted).
377. See supra Part II.A.2.e.
378. See Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997) (describing the state
constitutional right to receive a sound basic education).
379. See N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(2) (1971).
380. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-408(b) (assigning counties the responsibility of
paying for public schools' facilities costs).
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relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, both interpretive and
substantive, than the alternative conclusion endorsed by the court.
The Union County court treated this argument for county power
even more poorly. There, the court not only rejected the argument that
the county's role in funding school construction was insufficient
authority for the county to adopt a school impact fee, but also concluded
that the county's role in generating money for school buildings was itself
an argument against the imposition of such fees! Union County, the
court observed, sought through the school impact fee "to shift
impermissibly a portion of the burden for funding school construction
onto developers seeking approval for new developments.""s'
Characterizing the Durham Land Owners decision as standing for the
proposition that "Durham County could not shift the financial
responsibility for funding school construction to new developments by
using a school impact fee,"m the Union Land Owners court said the same
The court explained that "the Constitution
rule bound Union County.
places the duty to fund public schools on the General Assembly and
concluding from this that counties may not "shift
local governments,
that duty using subdivision ordinances that impose fees or similar
devices upon developers of new construction."
The court's reasoning was that Union County, by adopting its
school impact fee, was somehow improperly passing the buck on its
obligation to fund school construction. But this cannot be. County
governments, like all governments, have no financial resources that are,
strictly speaking, their own. County governments, like all governments,
County
must generate revenue by imposing taxes and fees.
and
programs
their
for
always
pay
all
governments,
like
governments,
services using other people's money, or at least money that comes from
other people. The court's argument that the county itself must foot the
bill for building schools, and that efforts to generate revenue to that end
are an attempt to "shift" the ultimate responsibility of building schools,
simply has no place in our system of government. The question county
officials face-indeed, that all government officials face-is not whether
they will extract revenue from others, but from whom the revenue will
381. Union Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Union, 689 S.E.2d 504, 508 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2009).
382. Id.
383. See id. (noting Union County's fee sought to "shift impermissibly a portion of the
burden for funding school construction onto developers seeking approval for new
developments").
384. Id.
385. Id.
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be extracted. To that question, Union County answered that developers
would pay an extra share of the cost to build schools. It was a
reasonable answer and one that, in light of the role counties play in
meeting the constitutional obligation to provide all school children an
opportunity to receive a sound basic education, was within the authority
of the county to make.
C. A Democratic Thought Experiment
There were, therefore, three arguable bases for Durham and Union
Counties to adopt their school impact fee ordinances: the police power,
the power to regulate and govern land use and development, and the
role played by counties in the provision of public schools. Court
decisions allowing the counties' ordinances to stand, in addition to
comporting with the counties' authority to regulate and govern within
these arenas, would have also been consistent with democracy.
To see how and why this is so, let us engage in a brief thought
experiment. We shall consider two scenarios, one in which the courts
uphold the counties' school impact fee ordinances and one in which the
courts strike down the ordinances. We will attempt in each scenario to
identify the ways in which the court's decision affects the achievement of
democracy, as measured in terms of the political accountability for
decision makers that is essential to democracy. 8 6
Consider first a scenario in which the ordinances are upheld as
properly adopted by the counties. The will of the people, as expressed
through their local elected representatives, would be honored. This by
itself is a significant consideration when measuring the scenario in terms
of democracy. Additionally, those county residents who supported
adoption of the ordinances would know which of their elected officials
agreed with them, allowing those citizens to reward those
representatives at the ballot box. Likewise, those who opposed adoption
of the school impact fees would know which officials and candidates
386. See, e.g., Battery Park Bank v. Madison County Comm'rs, 47 S.E. 1016, 1019
(N.C. 1904) (Connor, J., dissenting) ("'The great powers given to the Legislature are
liable to be abused. But this is inseparable from the nature of human institutions. The
wisdom of man has never conceived of a government with power sufficient to answer its
legitimate ends and at the same time incapable of mischief. No political system can be
made so perfect that its rulers will always hold it to its true course. In the very best, a
great deal must be trusted to the discretion of those who administer it. In ours the
people have given large powers to the Legislature, and relied for faithful execution of
them on the wisdom and honesty of that department and on the direct accountability of
the members to their constituents."' (quoting Sharpless v. Mayor, 21 Pa. 147, 161-62
(1853))).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol33/iss2/2

72

Roessler: Public Education, Local Authority, and Democracy: The Implied Pow
2011]1

SCHOOL IMPACT FEES

311

they would seek to defeat at the polls and could work to do so.
Everyone would know, in short, with whom responsibility lies for
adoption of the fees. It would also be clear that it was not judges or state
legislators who were responsible for the imposition of the fees; these two
groups could honestly claim that they simply stood aside and allowed
local democracy to take its course. If anyone complained to them about
the fees, they could reasonably point their fingers at county
commissioners as the responsible agents of government. The lines of
political accountability in this scenario would be clear.
Now consider a scenario in which the ordinances are struck down
as exceeding the counties' authority. County commissioners could
reasonably say they tried to address the issue of overcrowded schools by
adopting a school impact fee, but that the courts stood in their way. The
courts, in turn, could answer any criticism of their action by saying they
were compelled to strike down the ordinances because local officials
adopted the fees without sufficient statutory authority to do so,
effectively assigning responsibility for the ordinances' invalidation to the
legislators who failed to give counties enough authority to impose the
fees. Legislators could respond by saying either that the judges got it
wrong or that local officials had not yet made a compelling enough case
for why counties should be given authority to impose school impact fees.
All the relevant political actors, in short, could plausibly blame someone
else, and political accountability would be, at best, unclear and, at worst,
nonexistent. This is the scenario we now face in North Carolina, and it
is not hospitable to the political accountability necessary to a healthy
democracy.
IV. CONCLUSION

It is undisputed that North Carolina's growth has resulted in
County
overcrowded classrooms and schools across the state.
governments, as a result, are struggling to meet their obligation to pay
for school construction and renovation and are looking for ways beyond
property taxation to generate revenue. One potential-and, admittedly,
partial-solution to the problem of school funding is impact fees, which
have the potential to generate millions of dollars for school construction.
The allure of imposing such fees on those persons and entities that help
to create the phenomenon of overcrowded schools-the developers and
builders of new homes and subdivisions-is real, and, at least in part,
understandable.
Counties' efforts to enact such fees, however, have been short-lived.
Legal challenges to the adoption of school impact fees have been brought
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against those counties that have not received individualized, express
authority from the General Assembly to impose such fees. These
challenges have succeeded, and the fees have been struck down.
The decisions invalidating these ordinances were wrongly decided.
Counties have ample authority under existing law to adopt school
impact fees without the need for additional, express authorization from
the legislature. That such authority is implied, not express, does not
make it any less real. Counties' ability and duty to exercise the police
power, to regulate the use and development of land, and to pay for the
construction and renovation of schools each provides sufficient
authority to adopt school impact fees.
It is no answer to this conclusion to say that counties have only
those powers given to them by the legislature. This is undeniably true.
The question, though, is not one of whether counties have been granted
power, but the scope of the power granted to them. In light of the broad
construction statute and democratic principles of interpretation, the
scope of the counties' authority is sufficient to support adoption of
school impact fees. The courts, of course, have disagreed.
This is unfortunate not only for those counties who are facing the
challenges associated with booming public school enrollments, but for
democracy generally. Our system of government is one in which the
people are to decide how they shall be governed. While it is the duty of
the courts to invalidate local ordinances that are repugnant to state law,
it is not the role of the courts to impose a judicial straitjacket on the
people and to arrest the law's development, thereby preventing the
people and their representatives from effectively responding to the
myriad challenges-overcrowded schools and otherwise-that will
inevitably arise during the lifetime of a community.
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